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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment dismissing all causes of action in the 
Third Party Complaint brought by Appellants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, D. Richard Linford and 
Lindsey Linford ("the Linfords") against Respondent/Third-Party Defendant, State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company ("State Farm Fire").1 The dispute between the parties arises out of a fire 
which caused property damage to portions ofthe Linfords' house. No one else's property was 
damaged and no one suffered bodily injury as a result of the fire. Because only the Linfords' 
property was damaged, the relevant coverage in the homeowners policy issued by State Farm Fire 
was Section I, Coverage A - Dwelling ("Coverage A"),z (R., pp. 95-131; See also relevant 
portions of the Policy attached as Ex. A to the Addendum hereto.) This is a first party coverage? 
Because there was no property damage or bodily injuries to anyone other than the Linfords, 
IThe Linfords also purport to appeal from the denial of their Cross-Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 1; 9.) It is well established Idaho law that the denial 
of summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal. Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 
376,973 P.2d 142, 146 (1999). As will be discussed throughout this Brief, the attempted appeal 
from a denial of summary judgment is but one in a series of frivolous, unsupportable arguments 
made by the Linfords. 
2There is no dispute between the parties regarding or appeal from payment for personal 
property losses or additional living expenses also triggered by the fire loss. (R., p. 187.) 
3First party coverage regards a claim by an insured under his or her own insurance policy 
for bodily injury or property damage suffered by the insured. First party coverage provides 
indemnity but not a defense. 
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Section II, Coverage L - Personal Liability ("Coverage L") does not apply. This is a third party 
coverage4 
Per the Linfords' homeowners policy, ifthere is a dispute as to the amount of the loss 
under Coverage A, the parties must have the loss appraised upon written demand of either party. 
(R., p. 112.) That appraisal process was demanded and carried out in accordance with the terms 
ofthe Policy and a signed, written letter agreement dated June 2, 2010 ("Letter Agreement"). 
(R., pp. 187-188; see also Ex. B to Addendum.) This Letter Agreement made various agreed 
upon modifications to the appraisal process and loss settlement provisions. The agreed upon 
appraiser determined the amount ofloss under Coverage A to be $205,757.63. (R., p. 217.) 
This appraisal amount was paid by State Farm Fire.5 
Despite there being no third party property damage or bodily injury claim against the 
Linfords and despite being paid the total amount of the fire loss as determined by the joint 
appraiser pursuant to the agreed upon appraisal process, the Linfords claim on appeal: (1) that 
State Farm Fire owed the Linfords a defense in the Dave's v. Linfords' lawsuit which seeks 
4Third party coverage regards a liability claim against the insured for property or bodily 
injury damages suffered by a third party and caused by the insured. Third party coverage 
provides an indemnity for and a duty to defend these claims. 
5State Farm Fire had paid, before the appraisal, its' estimate for replacement costs for the 
fire damage to the house ($197,065.67). (R., p. 32.) State Farm Fire paid the additional amount 
determined in the appraisal process of $8,691.96 immediately following the appraisal. (R., p. 
219.) 
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money damages for breach of two separate and distinct written construction contracts;6 and (2) 
that State Farm Fire owes the Linfords whatever amount is ultimately determined to be due in the 
separate Dave's v. Lirifords action for breach of the Fire Damage Contract. 
The Linfords base their appeal upon the following arguments: 
1. That a lawsuit by Dave's against the Linfords for breach of the Fire 
Damage Contract triggers a duty to defend under the first party, property 
damage coverage, Coverage A; or 
2. Alternatively, that the lawsuit by Dave's triggers a duty to defend under 
the liability coverage, Coverage L; and 
3. That the appraisal process either does not apply to the Linfords' dispute 
with State Farm Fire or it determined the wrong amount of loss; and 
4. That the Fire Damage Contract between the Linfords and their contractor 
(Dave's) establishes the amount ofloss owed by State Farm Fire 
regardless of the outcome of the dispute resolution process set forth in 
their contract with State Farm Fire. 
These are frivolous, unreasonable or unsupportable arguments because: (1) by definition 
and well established insurance principles, there is no duty to defend under a first party coverage 
like Coverage A; (2) because Dave's Complaint does not allege that it suffered either property 
damage or bodily injury, there is not even a possibility of a duty to defend under Coverage L; (3) 
the Linfords expressly agreed to be bound by whatever amount was determined by appraisal; and 
(4) a separate breach of contract lawsuit cannot, as a matter oflaw, determine the amount owed 
under the Policy. 
6These two contracts are between the Linfords and their contractor, Dave'S, to repair the 
fire damage ("Fire Damage Contract") and to remodel other portions of the house ("Remodeling 
Contract"). 
-3-
Simply said, the Linfords are asking the judicial system to relieve them of their 
contractual obligations to Dave's and make State Farm Fire pay those obligations and provide a 
defense in a separate breach of contract lawsuit. They seek this result by contorting the meaning 
of insurance law, the homeowners policy, the facts and their own Letter Agreement beyond any 
reasonable interpretation. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
State Farm Fire generally agrees with the Linfords' Course of Proceedings. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
State Farm Fire adds the following to the Linfords' Statement of Facts: 
CORRECTION - Appellants' Brief, p. 1. The Linfords' home did not burn down 
as a result of the fire. It was only partially damaged. 
CORRECTION - Appellants' Brief, p. 8. The June 2,2010 letter agreement, does 
not make "one minor modification." There are, in fact, nine modifications to the appraisal 
process and loss settlement provisions of the Policy, including: 
(R., p. 188.) 
- the parties agree to resolve and set the amount of loss under 
Coverage A of the Policy by appraisal; 
- Mr. Berkson will determine the cost to repair damages to the 
dwelling, caused by the fire, as if he was a contractor on the date of 
loss (amount ofloss); 
- Mr. Berkson will provide a written appraisal ofthe amount of 
loss to the insureds and State Farm; 
- The parties agree to be bound by the written appraisal; 
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Prior to completing repairs to the house, State Farm Fire estimated the actual cash value 
("ACV") to repair the fire damage to be $153,751.40 (R., p. 132). On March 20, 2007, the 
Linfords entered into the Fire Damage Contract with their own local contractor, Dave's, Inc. 
("Dave's"), to repair the fire damage to the house based on the ACV estimate. (R., pp. 59-63.) It 
specifically provides that Dave's would furnish all material and perform all the labor necessary to 
complete the following work: 
Rebuild home from fire damage, as for the State Farm 
Insurance estimate of $153,751.40. 
(R., p. 59) (emphasis in original). 
On May 9, 2007, the Linfords entered into a separate Remodeling Contract. (R., pp. 65-
69.) In relevant part, this Remodeling Contract provides that Dave's would furnish all material 
and perform all the labor necessary to complete the following work: 
Any and all changes that are not paid for by State Farm Inc. Co. 
(R., p. 65) (emphasis in original). 
After completing repairs to the house, State Farm Fire estimated and paid ad additional 
amount reflecting the replacement cost to repair the fire damage to the house for a total of 
$197,065.67. (R., p. 187.) A dispute then arose between the Linfords and State Farm Fire 
regarding the amount owed after completion of the repairs. (Id) 
A dispute also arose between the Linfords and Dave's regarding the amount that Dave's 
was to be paid for the services it provided to repair and remodel the fire damaged house. On 
August 4, 2010, Dave's filed an Amended Verified Complaint ("Complaint") against the 
-5-
Linfords, in which Dave's asserted the Linfords owed an additional $91,357.82 for the 
construction services provided under both the Fire Damage Contract and the Remodeling 
Contract. (R., pp. 49-70.). The Complaint asserted three causes of action against the Linfords 
based on these two contracts: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing; and (3) unjust enrichment. (R., pp. 58-54.) 
On September 9,2009, the Linfords' counsel tendered Dave's Complaint to State Farm 
Fire for a defense and indemnification. (R., pp. 132-134.) At issue were two types of coverage 
provided to the Linfords: (1) Section I - Your Property - Coverage A, which provides indemnity 
for losses suffered by the Linfords (Id., pp. 105-107.); and (2) Section II - Your Liability-
Coverage L - Personal Liability, which provides a defense and indemnity for claims asserted 
against the Linfords for property damage or bodily injuries suffered by third parties. (R., 113-
114.) On November 11,2009, State Farm Fire sent correspondence to the Linfords explaining 
that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the Linfords for the claims asserted by Dave's. 
(R. pp. 153-155.) 
The Linfords then filed a Third-Party Complaint against State Farm Fire asserting four 
causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) indemnification; (3) breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) insurance bad faith. (R., pp. 70-84.) 
In an effort to seek resolution of the first party claims for fire damage to the Linfords' 
house as stated in the Third-Party Complaint, by Letter Agreement, counsel for the Linfords and 
State Farm Fire agreed to have the amount of loss resolved by appraisal ("Letter Agreement"). 
(R., pp. 187-188; Appendix B.) That appraisal process was completed on October 13,2010. (R., 
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p. 189.) The amount ofloss was determined in a written appraisal to be $205,757.63. (R., p. 
217.) On November 1, 2010, State Farm Fire paid the Linfords, pursuant to the written appraisal, 
an additional $8,691.96,. (R., pp. 218-219.) 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
State Farm Fire presents the following additional or more specific issues on appeal: 
1. Does State Farm Fire owe a duty to defend under Coverage A of the homeowners 
policy (new issue raised by the Linfords on appeal)? 
2. Did the district court err in holding State Farm Fire had no duty to defend under 
Coverage L of the homeowners policy? 
3. Did the district court err in holding there was no breach of the duty to indemnify 
because the amount owed for all fire loss damage to the house was determined by appraisal and 
paid by State Farm Fire? 
4. Did the district court err in dismissing the breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing and bad faith causes of action? 
5. Are the Linfords entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
6. Is State Farm Fire entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-
1839(4) for the Linfords bringing a frivolous, unreasonable and/or unsupportable appeal? 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Standards of Review on Appeal. 
1. Standard of Review for Grants of Summary Judgment. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as 
the district court's standard in ruling upon the motion. Thomson v. Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 
475-476,50 P.3d 488, 490-491 (2002). Thus, this Court will review the record before the district 
court, including the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits, if any, to determine de 
novo whether, after construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there 
exists any genuine issues of material fact and whether the successful movant below is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. Tusch Enterprise v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 40,740 P.2d 1022, 1026 
(1987); I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
2. Standard of Review for Denial of Summary Judgment. 
"It is well settled in Idaho that an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an 
appealable order itself, nor is it reviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Tiegs v. 
Robertson, 149 Idaho 482, 484, 236 P.3d 474, 476 (Ct. App. 2010). "[A]n order denying a 
motion for summary judgment is not a final order and direct appeal cannot be taken from it. 
Moreover, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371,376,973 P.2d 142, 147 (1999). 
Therefore, this Court cannot consider Appellants' issue on appeal that the district court erred in 
not granting summary judgment on their behalf. 
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3. Standard of Review for Contract Interpretation Issues. 
The interpretation of the legal effect of a policy of insurance is a questions of law over 
which this Court exercises de novo review. Howard v. Oregon Mutual Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214, 
46 P.3d 510 (2002). Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, the determination and effect of 
a contractual provision is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Tolley v. THI Co., 140 
Idaho 253, 92 PJd 503 (2004). Interpreting contracts and applying law to undisputed facts 
constitutes matters of law which this Court also reviews de novo. Fisk v. Royal Carribean 
Cruises, Ltd., 141 Idaho 290, 292, 108 P.3d 990,992 (2004). 
B. Analysis. 
1. State Farm Fire Owes No Duty to Defend the Linfords. 
The district court properly determined, based on the unambiguous terms of the policy, 
that State Farm Fire had no duty to defend the Linfords against Dave's Complaint under 
Coverage L (Personal Liability). (R., p. 370.) The district court did so based upon "the broadest 
of readings" of Dave's Complaint that might bring any alleged claim against the Linfords within 
the policy's liability coverage. Id On appeal, the Linfords challenge the district court's finding 
of no duty to defend under Coverage L. They have also made a new argument on appeal -- that 
State Farm Fire alternatively owes a duty to defend under Coverage A (Property Damage)? 
Critical to the rejection of these frivolous arguments is a review of the language and well known 
differences between Coverage A and Coverage L. 
7This new argument/issue on appeal should not be reviewed. Kirkman v. Stoker, 134 
Idaho 541,544,6 P.3d 397, 400 (2000). 
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a. There is No Duty to Defend Under Coverage A .8 
(1) There is No Express Duty to Defend Provision Under Coverage A, 
a First Party Coverage. 
Nowhere in Section I, the section that includes Coverage A, is there any mention of or 
reference to a duty to defend. This is not surprising since property insurance, or any first party 
coverage, is not the type of insurance that provides an insured a defense should the insured be 
sued for any reason, whether it be for property damage or bodily injury to others caused by the 
fire, or even breach of a contract related to the fire.9 The homeowners policy's property coverage 
provides indemnity to the Linfords for the cost to repair or replace the fire loss damage to their 
house (i.e., losses suffered by the Linfords themselves). It does not provide an express duty to 
defend of any kind. To argue otherwise is frivolous and unsupportable and misunderstands basic 
insurance law. 
8The Linfords claim error because the district court only analyzed the duty to defend 
under Coverage L. (Appellants' Brief, p. 19.) The district court cannot rule upon that which has 
not been presented. At no time did the Linfords brief or argue to the district court that State 
Farm Fire owed a duty to defend under Coverage A. All prior arguments were based on a duty to 
defend under Coverage L. Other than for purposes of determining whether to award attorney fees 
on appeal for making frivolous arguments, this issue on appeal should not be reviewed. See 
Turner v. Cold Springs Canyon Ltd. Partnership, 143 Idaho 227, 230,141 P.3d 1096,1099 
(2006). 
9To the extent an insurance policy has a duty to defend provision, it would be found in the 
liability coverage. 
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(2) The Allegations in Dave's Complaint Do Not Reveal a Potential 
for Liability Covered by the Policy. 
The duty to defend arises upon the filing of a complaint whose allegations, in whole or in 
part, read broadly, reveal apotential for liability that would be covered by the insurance policy. 
County of Kootenai v. The Western Casualty and Surety Co., 113 Idaho 908, 910, 750 P.2d 87, 
89 (1988). Consequently, the only documents to be reviewed to determine whether a duty to 
defend exists are Dave's Complaint and the insurance policy. 
Coverage A is property insurance. The Linfords correctly identifY this type of insurance 
as one "to indemnify another in whole or in part up to a specified amount for loss or damage to 
designated property by fire." (Appellants' Brief, p. 13, citing CoUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., § 1 :37 
(1995).) (Emphasis added.) Property insurance provides first party coverage. First party "applies 
to an insured or the insured's own property, such as ... fire insurance." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY, 8th Ed., p. 817 (2004). Coverage A is therefore a first party coverage for fire 
losses incurred by the Linfords to their own property. 
Coverage A specifically provides coverage for property damage to the Linfords' house. 
(R., p. 101.) The losses insured by this coverage are "for accidental, direct, physical loss to the 
property ... " (R., p. 105.) 
Dave's Complaint against the Linfords seeks damages for the Linfords' breach of the Fire 




On or about January 19,2007, Defendant's [sic] residence suffered 
from a fire, by reason of which Defendant [sic] needed home 
repairs, renovation and remodeling to be conducted. . .. 
7 
Plaintiff is in the business of providing services as a general 
contractor, and is licensed as such in the State ofIdaho. Plaintiff's 
services include, but are not limited to, providing home repairs, 
renovation and remodeling. 
8 
On or about March 20, 2007, Plaintiff and Defendant [sic] entered 
in to [sic] an [sic] written agreement whereunder Plaintiff would 
provide such services and materials needed to repair, renovate and 
remodel Defendant's [sic] residence as it related to the fire damage 
the home suffered. '" 
9 
On or about May 9, 2007, Plaintiff and Defendant [sic] entered in 
to [sic] an [sic] written agreement whereunder Plaintiff would 
provide such services and materials needed to renovate and 
remodel Defendant's [sic] residence as it related to other parts of 
Defendant's [sic] home that did not suffer fire damage. 
11 
Despite the foregoing, Defendant [sic] has failed and refused to 
fully compensate Plaintiff in accordance with their above-
referenced written agreements. The amount due and owing to 
Plaintiff by Defendant [sic], together with accrued interest as set 
forth in the agreements, as of June 4, 2009 is $91,357.82. 
(R., pp. 51-52.) Dave's Complaint does not allege an accidental loss that resulted in property 
damage or bodily injury to Dave's. It does not allege that Dave's suffered a direct, physical loss 
of any kind. Nor does it allege that it seeks damages for bodily injury or property damage to the 
Linfords or their property. It is clearly and unequivocally a breach of contract complaint for 
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which there is no coverage, let alone a potential for coverage. Consequently, under the "potential 
liability for coverage" test for determining whether the Complaint allegations even remotely 
touch on a covered liability, Dave's Complaint fails utterly. 
The Linfords themselves identify Coverage A as an indemnity coverage for loss or 
damage to their own property. (R., p. 13.) But they utterly misapply the common and 
unambiguous understanding of how and to what this coverage applies. From this indemnity 
coverage the Linfords seek a defense to a breach of contract lawsuit seeking monetary damages 
suffered by someone other than themselves (Dave's) and for something other than bodily injury 
or property. Coverage A is indemnity only and does not in any manner provide for a duty to 
defend the insured against any lawsuit, especially a breach of contract lawsuit. At the end of the 
day, the only issues that will be decided in the Dave's v. Lirifords action is whether the Linfords 
have breached the Fire Damage and Remodeling Contracts and the amount of damages owed, if 
any, under those contracts to Dave's. There is no "potential for liability" duty to defend against 
these allegations under Coverage A. To claim otherwise is frivolous and unsupportable. 
(3) A Duty to Indemnify Does Not Create an Implied Duty to Defend 
Under Coverage A. 
The Linfords argue, without any support in the law, that there is an automatic duty to 
defend when there is a duty to indemnify. (Appellants' Brief, p. 20.) The Linfords base this 
frivolous argument on the theory that because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to 
indemnify, if there is a narrower duty to indemnify, ipso Jacto there is a duty to defend. (Jd) 
This circular argument is not true even in its broadest sense. First, Coverage A is a first party 
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property damage coverage. This type of insurance only indemnifies and does not provide a 
defense. Under the Linfords' theory, all indemnity-only insurance coverages would be converted 
into liability coverages simply because they offer the narrower duty to indemnify.JO If there is no 
express duty to defend provision, the contract cannot be re-written to include one. See Lovey v. 
Regence Blueshield o/Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41,72 P.3d 877, 881 (2009) (courts do not posses 
the roving power to rewrite contracts). 
Second, this argument makes even less sense in the context of this appeal. Coverage A 
does not even have the narrower duty to indemnify the Linfords for any breach of contract 
damages that may be awarded to Dave's in its lawsuit. The only duty to indemnify is for damage 
to the Linfords' property. A non-existent duty to indemnify damages arising out of the breach of 
contract complaint cannot trigger a non-existent duty to defend that claim. I I 
There is no duty to defend under Coverage A by definition, by contract interpretation or 
by operation of well established law. The Linfords' new attempt to create one is frivolous, 
unreasonable and unsupportable. 
JOlt would also transmute the standard fire policy set forth in Idaho Code § 41-2401 into a 
personal liability policy. 
"Indeed, there cannot even be an implied duty to defend as argued by the Linfords 
because there is not even apotential for liability revealed by Dave's Complaint. 
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b. The Express Duty to Defend Provision Under Coverage L was Not 
Triggered by Dave's Complaint. 
Unlike Coverage A, Coverage L has an express duty to defend provision. 
COVERAGE L - PERSONAL LIABILITY 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for 
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which 
this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, we will: 
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. 
(R., p. 113.) Like Coverage A, there is no duty to defend triggered by Dave's Complaint under 
Coverage L. 
The same test applied above to Coverage A applies to whether there is a duty to defend 
under Coverage L. The issue is whether Dave's Complaint reveals apotential for some liability 
covered by the homeowners policy. 
(1) The Undisputed Facts and Clear Policy Language Preclude a Duty 
to Defend Under Coverage L. 
Coverage L is personal liability insurance. Commonly referred to as casualty insurance, 
the Linfords properly identifY this type of insurance to be "insurance against loss through 
accidents or casualties resulting in bodily injury or death". (Appellants' Brief, p. 13, citing 
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d., § 1 :28 (1995).) (See also R., p. 113.) Casualty insurance also 
includes damage to property. This coverage applies to bodily injury or property damage to 
others. (R., p. 115.) (Exclusion 2. b.) This type of insurance protects an insured if he or she 
causes the bodily injury or property damage to third parties. 
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Liability insurance is a third party coverage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 8th Ed., p. 817 
(2004). ("[a]n agreement to cover a loss resulting from the insured's liability to a third party .. , 
. Also termed third-party insurance; ... ") Coverage L is therefore for claims asserted by third 
parties against the Linfords resulting from their liability. Coverage L, under the terms of the 
homeowners policy, requires that the covered loss be for property damage or bodily injury 
suffered by these third parties. Therefore, Dave's suit must be based on allegations against the 
Linfords "because of' their personal liability for property damage or bodily injury suffered by 
Dave's. 
In order to trigger a defense, Dave's lawsuit against the Linfords must allege "damages 
because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies .... " (R., p. 113.) 
The Linfords do not claim that Dave's Complaint seeks damages "because of' bodily injury. 
They argue, however, that Dave's Complaint seeks damages "because of' property damage to 
their house. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 22,26.) This argument is false - Dave's Complaint seeks 
damages because the Linfords failed to pay for services rendered. 
"Property damage" is specifically defined in the Linfords' homeowners policy as 
"physical damage to or destruction oftangible property, including loss of use of this property . 
. " (R., p. 100.) The damages sought in Dave's Complaint must also be "caused by an 
occurrence". (R., p. 113.) The homeowners policy defines occurrence as "an accident". (R., p. 
100.) 
Dave's Complaint allegations are not "because of' physical damage to or destruction of 
any of his tangible property. Dave's Complaint seeks damages "because of' a breach of contract 
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by the Linfords leading to economic damages suffered by Dave's or, stated another way, 
"because of' the LInfords' decision not to pay what is owed under their contracts with Dave's. 
Even if the breach of contract damages were "because of' property damage, the independent 
clause "caused by an occurrence" requires that the damages (regardless of whether they are for 
bodily injury, property damages or breach of contract) be caused by an accident. It is certainly no 
accident the Linfords did not pay Dave's. A breach of contract is not, and cannot be, an accident 
and, therefore, cannot be an occurrence as required by Coverage L. 
The plain meaning of "because of' within the context of the duty to defend provision and 
the liability section of the policy does not encompass Dave's Complaint. Dave's Complaint was 
not brought "because of' physical damage to its property caused by an accident. Dave's 
Complaint was brought "because of' the Linfords' breach of the Fire Damage and Remodeling 
Contracts by failing to pay for services rendered. 
From the common and well established understanding of liability insurance, the Linfords 
attempt to extract a duty to defend a breach of contract lawsuit that makes no allegations that a 
Third Party suffered property damage or bodily injury from the fire or that these damages were 
caused by the Linfords' negligence. Neither the alleged breach of contract or the damages sought 
trigger Coverage L, let alone a duty to defend under Coverage L. 
(2) Well Settled Law Precludes a Duty to Defend Under Coverage L. 
In addition to the Linfords' twisted interpretation and application of the duty to defend, 
they ignore well-settled law. This Court has previously made it clear that a breach of contract 
complaint does not trigger coverage under a liability policy. 
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Both the amended complaint and the district court's instructions to 
the jury indicate that the Harper v. MVP lawsuit was an action for 
breach of contract, and did not involve any claim for damages in 
tort. MVP has failed to demonstrate that damage to property was 
at issue in the underlying suit. The Harper v. MVP lawsuit was a 
contract action, and there was no allegation of either "property 
damage" or an "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy. 
Magic Valley Potato Shippers v. Continental Ins., 112 Idaho 1073, 1076-77, 739 P.2d 372,375-
76 (1987) (bold in original).12 
Like the complaint in Magic Valley, Dave's Complaint is one for breach of contract. Like 
the complaint in Magic Valley, Dave's Complaint does not allege any claim for damages in tort. 
Like the complaint in Magic Valley, there are no allegations of "property damage" within the 
meaning of the policy (i.e., property damage to the property of Dave's). Like the complaint in 
Magic Valley, Dave's Complaint makes no allegation of an "occurrence" within the meaning of 
the policy (Le., the Linfords caused, by accident, the damage suffered by Dave'S). It matters not 
that the policy at issue in Magic Valley was a commercial general liability policy. (Appellants' 
12COurtS in other jurisdictions have come to the same conclusions as this Court -- a breach 
of contract claim cannot constitute an "occurrence" under policies triggered by an accident or an 
occurrence. See Jakobson Shipyard, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 961 F.2d 387, 389 (2d 
Cir.1992) (finding no accident where insured shipbuilder provided tug boat with defective 
steering mechanism contrary to contract specifications); Pace Constr. Co. v. United States Fid & 
Guar. Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir.l991) (no accident where insured subcontractor 
breached contractual duty to procure insurance for contractor); Oak Crest Constr. Co. v. Austin 
Mutual Ins. Co., 329 Or. 620, 626, 998 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Or. 2000) (" ... there can be no 
'accident,' within the meaning of a commercial liability policy, when the resulting damage is 
merely a breach of contract..."); Nationwide Property & Cas. v. Comer, 559 F.Supp.2d 685,692 
(S.D. W.Va. 2008) (insurer did not have a duty to indemnify or defend insured vendors against 
purchasers' claim for rescission based on alleged breach of contract, since breaches of contracts 
were not accidents and therefore not occurrences as defined by the homeowner's policy, which 
defined occurrence to include property damage resulting from an accident). 
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Brief, p. 23.) The same issue was extant - does a breach of contract lawsuit create even the 
potential of coverage under a liability policy? The clear and unequivocal answer under long 
established Idaho law is "no". 
Nevertheless, the Linfords argue that Magic Valley is distinguishable because it discussed 
an exclusion for breach of contract and State Farm Fire could have drafted a similar exclusion in 
order to make Magic Valley applicable in this case. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 23-24.) The breach 
of contract exclusion was not necessary to the finding that there was no coverage in Magic 
Valley. Rather, the contract exclusion was supporting evidence that there was no genuine issue 
of material fact on the coverage issue. 
Regardless, Coverage L has an applicable "owned property" exclusion and therefore, like 
Magic Valley, provides supporting evidence that there is no duty to defend the Linfords against 
Dave's Complaint. This exclusion provides: 
2. Coverage L does not apply to: 
b. Property damage to property currently owned by any insured; 
(R., p. 114-115.) Exclusion 2.b. excludes liability from coverage for property damage to the 
Linfords' property. This excludes from liability coverage any lawsuit brought "because of' 
property damage to the insured's property. As in Magic Valley, because there is a similar in 
affect exclusion for fire loss to property owned by the Linfords, there is further evidence that 
there is no potential for liability coverage and no duty to defend. 
The frivolousness of the Linfords' position on appeal regarding a duty to defend under 
either Coverage A or L cannot be stated more clearly than in their own words. 
-19-
This distinction (between property insurance and liability 
insurance) is important because contracts of insurance should be 
considered in view of their general objectives. E.g., Rauert, 61 
Idaho at 680, 106 P.2d at 10 18. Property insurance, such as a 
homeowners policy, is purchased to protect an asset from loss or 
destruction. Casualty insurance, on the other hand, is purchased to 
insure "against loss through accidents or casualties resulting in 
bodily injury or death." Couch on Ins., 3d. § 1 :28. A business 
would not expect its casualty insurance to protect it from breach of 
contract, but homeowners would most certainly believe that their 
homeowners insurance would provide a defense when a suit is 
initiated against them "because of' fire damage caused to their 
home. 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 24.y3 The Linfords properly describe the general objectives of Coverage A 
- it is purchased to protect their assets from loss or destruction. The Linfords correctly identifY 
the general objectives of Coverage L -- it is insurance purchased to insure them against loss 
through accidents or casualties resulting in property damage. The Linfords properly state that 
casualty insurance does not cover breach of contract claims against businesses. Where the 
Linfords go horribly wrong is when they immediately ignore these general objectives and axioms 
of insurance law and extend property insurance coverage to a claim (Dave's) that is not for loss 
or destruction of the Linfords' assets and extend personal liability insurance coverage to 
homeowners for breach of contract claims as long as the contract at issue has some connection to 
13The Linfords admit elsewhere in their Brief that "a policy designed to cover injuries to 
third parties will not cover breach of contract." (Appellants' Brief, p. 25.) But the Linfords 
claim that this issue is not present in this case by redefining the issue (and insurance law) to 
"whether State Farm has a duty to protect the Linfords from an alleged breach of contract that 
they did not wish to enter into in the first place and only did so "because of' a covered 
occurrence". (Jd.) Aside from its nonsensical syntax, accepting this argument would stand 
insurance law on its head. 
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a fire loss. The only basis the Linfords give for extending coverage to homeowners for that 
which they claim is only available to businesses is the parties' expectations. This Court long ago 
did away with the parties expectations as a basis for coverage. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 138 Idaho 443, 450,65 P.3d 184, 191 (2003). 
The Linfords cannot seek a defense to a suit brought against them for breach of contract 
that has nothing to do with protecting their home from fire loss or defending against a claim for 
property damage accidentally caused by the Linfords and suffered by a third party. The suit by 
Dave's was filed "because of' the Linfords' failure to pay money due under their contract with 
Dave's. There is no duty to defend under Coverage L. Pursuant to the well established rules of 
insurance contract interpretation and well established law in Idaho, there is no duty to defend 
owed by State Farm Fire against the breach of contract allegations in Dave's Complaint under 
either Coverage A or Coverage L. The arguments the Linfords make on appeal are frivolous, 
unreasonable and unsupportable. 
2. State Farm Fire's Duty to Indemnify for Fire Loss to the Linfords' House 
was Met Upon Payment of the Appraisal Amount. 
State Farm Fire acknowledged the fire loss and its duty to indemnifY under Coverage A 
on the day of the fire. (R., p. 271-277.) After acknowledging the fire loss and before repairs to 
the house were completed, State Farm Fire paid an estimated actual cash value ofthe repairs in 
the amount of$153,751.40. (R., p. 365.) This payment was made pursuant to paragraph l.a.(1) 
of Coverage A - Dwelling Loss Settlement provision of the homeowners policy (hereinafter 
referred to as "ACV Paragraph"). (R., p. 109.) After repairs to the house were completed on 
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April 25, 2008, State Farm Fire paid an additional amount of$43,314.27, representing the 
replacement cost of the covered repairs. (R., pp. 58; 366.) This brought the total payment 
amount to $197,065.67. This payment was made pursuant to paragraph l.a.(2) of the Coverage 
A - Dwelling Loss Settlement provision (hereinafter referred to as "RC Paragraph"). (R., p. 
109.) 
A dispute arose over whether the Linfords were entitled to another, additional payment 
for replacement cost of the repairs. (R., p. 187.) On May 7, 2010, State Farm Fire "demanded 
that the amount of the loss under Coverage A be set/determined by appraisal." (Jd) The 
Linfords agreed to appraisal. (Appellants' Brief, p. 28.) The Linfords and State Farm Fire then 
signed a Letter Agreement modifYing the contractual appraisal and loss settlement provisions of 
the Policy. (R., p. 188.) Of note was the substantive modification that expressly defined how the 
amount ofloss was to be determined by the appraiser. 
Mr. Berkson will determine the cost to repair damages to the 
dwelling, caused by the fire, as if he was a contractor on the date of 
the loss (amount ofloss). 
(R., p. 188.) This Letter Agreement misdefined the calculation of the amount of the loss used in 
either the ACV or RC Paragraphs. The parties further agreed that the appraiser would provide "a 
written appraisal of the amount of loss to the insured" and "to be bound by the written appraisal." 
14The Linfords state that the district court "correctly" noted the Letter Agreement follows 
the terms of the Appraisal Paragraph with one modification: the parties jointly appointed one 
appraiser and State Farm Fire agreed to pay all of his fees and expenses. (Appellants' Brief, p. 
28.) (Citing the district court's decision, R., p. 372.) The Linfords misinterpret this part the 
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The appraiser issued his written appraisal on October 13,2010. (R., p. 189-217.) In the 
cover letter the appraiser indicated that the appraisal "has been completed in accordance with the 
directives given in the letter dated June 2, 2010 [Letter Agreement], by Elam & Burke, as was 
agreed to by all parties." (R., p. 189.) (bracketed information added.) The appraiser determined 
that the amount ofloss to which the parties agreed to be bound was $205,757.63. (R., p. 217.) 
State Farm Fire had already paid $197,065.67. (R., p. 32.) Based on the agreement to be bound 
by the appraisal, State Farm Fire paid an additional $8,691.96. (R., p. 218.) 
The analysis of whether State Farm Fire breached its duty to indemnifY can, and should, 
stop here. The amount of indemnity owed was determined in an agreed upon alternative dispute 
resolution proceeding. The amount was determined by an agreed upon formula. The parties 
agreed to be bound by the process and the result. State Farm Fire promptly paid the additional 
amount of indemnity owed. The Linfords accepted the additional proceeds from this agreed 
upon appraisal process. The district court properly determined there was no breach of the duty to 
indemnifY based on the unambiguous policy provisions, the undisputed facts and the terms of the 
Letter Agreement. Nevertheless, the Linfords ask the Court to relieve them of their promise to be 
bound by their agreement and allow them to seek breach of contract and bad faith damages 
against State Farm Fire. State Farm Fire did not breach its duty to indemnifY the Linfords. The 
district court's decision and then use this misinterpretation to distance themselves from the other 
modifications made by the Letter Agreement, including agreeing to be bound by the appraiser's 
calculation of the amount ofloss. A proper reading of the district court's decision indicates that 
the district court was discussing one modification to the appointment process of three appraisers 
and noted that this appointment process had f! modification. (R., p. 371-372.) On its face, the 
Letter Agreement signed by the Linfords' counsel has nine modifications. (R., p. 188.) 
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Linfords should be held to their agreement and dismissal of the duty to indemnifY should be 
upheld. 
a. The Linfords are Bound by the Insurance Contract Dispute Resolution 
Process (Appraisal). 
Alternative dispute resolution is a favored remedy. International Association 0/ 
Firefighters Local No. 672 v. City o/Boise, 136 Idaho 162, 168,30 P.3d 940, 946 (2001) 
(discussing arbitration). 15 Alternative dispute resolution allows parties to settle their disputes 
without expending time and unnecessary expense on needless litigation. Bingham County 
Commission v. Interstate Electric Company, 105 Idaho 36, 41, 665 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1983) 
(discussing arbitration). 
The essential nature of arbitration is that the parties, by consensual 
agreement, have decided to substitute the final and binding 
judgment of an impartial entity conversant with the business world 
for the judgment of the courts. They seek to avoid the cost, in both 
time and money, of formal judicial dispute resolution. But when 
the parties bargain for the binding decision of an arbitrator, they 
necessarily accept the fact that his interpretation of the facts, the 
law, and the equities of the situation may not be entirely 
satisfactory to them. 
Id., 105 Idaho at 42, 665 P .2d at 1052. 
The Linfords argue on appeal that they are not bound by the appraisal process because it 
did not determine what they were owed under the homeowners policy; instead, that amount is to 
be determined by a jury in a different lawsuit based upon breach of a separate written contract 
!SIn the setting of this case, there is no reasoned distinction between appraisal and 
arbitration. They are similar in that both can bind the parties regarding the extent or amount of 
loss. 
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entered into with a third party (Dave's). (Appellants' Brief, pp. 29, fn 4; 30.) The basis of this 
argument is that "the appraisal determined the loss, not the amount spent to replace the damage". 
(Jd) Consequently, the argument continues, the Appraisal Paragraph is irrelevant and the 
Linfords are entitled to whatever amount is owed under Dave's Fire Damage Contract as 
determined in Dave's lawsuit. (Jd.) The Linfords' arguments are based upon a tortured reading 
of the insurance policy and upon either ignoring or otherwise distancing themselves from the 
provisions of the Appraisal Paragraph and Letter Agreement. 16 
The Appraisal Paragraph in the policy states the "[w]ritten agreement signed by any two 
of these three [appraisers] shall set the amount of the loss. (R., p. 112.) (bracketed information 
and emphasis added.) The Letter Agreement modified this to a single appraiser. (R., p. 188.) 
The Linfords agreed to this in part to save money, one ofthe express purposes of ADR, because 
State Farm Fire agreed to pay all costs and fees ofthe appraisal. (R., pp. 187-188.) The 
Linfords, who were represented by counsel during the Letter Agreement negotiations, also agreed 
to be bound by the appraisal process. (R., p. 188.) Clearly, the parties bargained for an 
alternative dispute resolution process. By agreeing to appraisal and to be bound by the process, 
the Linfords gave up their right to be dissatisfied with or ignore the process. (See Jd.) 
Alternatively, the Linfords argue that the Appraisal Paragraph does not apply to this 
dispute because the applicable loss settlement provision is missing a word. (Appellants' Brief, p. 
16Whatever amount is determined in Dave's v. Linfords is not binding on State Farm Fire 
because it is not a party. Nor does the policy say it will pay what is determined in a third party 
case. 
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30.) In order to fully understand and then dispel this frivolous argument, the relevant, clear and 
unambiguous policy language must be explored. 
There are two types of payments owed to an insured for property losses to dwellings 
under the subject homeowners policy property coverage. The first is known as actual cash value 
which is estimated and paid early in the process in order to provide the insured with funds to 
begin repairing the fire damage. The loss provision paragraph applicable to an actual cash value 
payment is paragraph 1.a.(1) (ACV Paragraph) and reads as follows: 
a. We will pay the cost to repair or replace with similar 
construction and for the same use of the premises ... the 
damaged part of the property covered ... subject to the 
following: 
(1) Until actual repair or replacement is completed, we 
will pay only the actual cash value at the time of the 
loss of the damaged part of the property, up to the 
applicable limit of liability shown in the 
Declarations not to exceed the cost to repair or 
replace the damaged part ofthe property; ... " 
(R., p. 109.) This estimate of damages applies until the repair of the fire loss is completed. 
Before repairs were completed, State Farm Fire estimated and paid to the Linfords ACV in the 
amount of$153,751.40. (R., p. 365.) 
Once the fire damage repair has been completed, a different payment amount is made if 
additional amounts are warranted by the circumstances of the repair (i.e., RC is more than ACV). 
This is for replacement cost under paragraph 1.a.(2) (RC Paragraph). 
(2) When the repair or replacement is actually 
completed, we will pay the covered additional 
amount you actually and necessarily spend to repair 
-26-
or replace the damaged part of the property, or an 
amount up to the applicable limit of liability shown 
in the Declarations, whichever is less; 
(R., p. 109.) After repairs were completed, State Farm Fire calculated and paid an additional 
amount of $43,314.27 in replacement cost, which subsumed the ACV amount already paid, for a 
total amount of loss of$197,065.67. (R., p. 1.) 
The Linfords agree the RC Paragraph is the applicable provision because the repairs to 
the house have been completed. (Appellants' Brief, p. 29.) But, the Linfords argue that the 
Appraisal Paragraph does not apply to the RC Paragraph and only applies to the ACV Paragraph. 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 30.) Therefore, the Linfords argue the appraisal is not binding upon them 
and/or it determined the actual cash value and therefore the appraisal is irrelevant to the amount 
owed now that repairs have been concluded. This house of cards is built upon the absence of a 
single word in the RC Paragraph - "loss". 
First, whether the Appraisal Paragraph applies to the ACV Paragraph or the RC 
Paragraph is a red herring argument. The Letter Agreement establishes that the amount of loss to 
be determined by appraisal "was the cost to repair damages, caused by fire, as if he was a 
contractor on the date of the loss (amount of loss)". (R., p. 188.) Whether the Appraisal 
Paragraph applies to a determination of the amount of loss under the ACV or RC Paragraphs is 
irrelevant. Indeed, the parties agreed the appraisal process was to determine what was owed 
under Coverage A, including what was actually and necessarily spent. The Letter Agreement 
controls as to how the amount of loss is to be determined. The tortured route taken by the 
Linfords to ignore their own agreement is prime evidence of the frivolous nature oftheir appeal. 
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Second, even ignoring the Letter Agreement modification as the Linfords do, no 
reasonable interpretation of the absence of the word "loss" in the RC Paragraph exempts the 
dispute over how much is owed the Linfords from the appraisal dispute resolution process set 
forth in the Appraisal Paragraph. On its face, it applies to all disputes over the amount of loss. 
(R., p. 112.) Regardless ofthe label used by the Linfords, they are disputing the amount ofloss 
owed to them under the homeowners policy. The Appraisal Paragraph unambiguously applies to 
all disputes over the amount of loss whether the Linfords call it as ACV dispute, an RC dispute, 
an actually and necessarily spent to repair dispute or a banana dispute. 
The Linfords argue that the Appraisal Paragraph applies to the ACV Paragraph but not to 
the RC Paragraph because the former has the word "loss" and the latter does not. The RC 
Paragraph has no different purpose than the ACV Paragraph - to provide the parameters for 
determining the amount of loss. The ACV Paragraph provides for determining the amount of 
loss before repairs are completed; the RC Paragraph provides for determining the amount of loss 
after repairs are completed. 
In addition, the context ofthe RC Paragraph clearly establishes that it is used to 
determine the amount of loss despite the absence of the word "loss" and is therefore subject to 
the Appraisal Paragraph. The RC Paragraph is found in Section I - Loss Settlement. (R. p. 109.) 
The introductory paragraph to that section states "[w]e will settle covered property losses 
according to the following." (Id.) (Emphasis added.) The next subparagraph identifies itself as 
"l.A. - Replacement Cost Loss Settlement - Similar Construction." (Id.) (Emphasis added.) 
The RC Paragraph is a sub-subparagraph in Section I - Loss Settlement and it is under the 
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introductory paragraph and under the Similar Construction Loss Settlement paragraph heading. 
(Id) The next sub subparagraph modifies the RC Paragraph and also has the word "loss" in it. 
(Jd) The Appraisal Paragraph says "amount of loss" or "amount of the loss" not once, but five 
times. (R., p. 112.) 
It is axiomatic that, when construing contract provisions, it must be done within the 
context in which it occurs in the policy. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 67, 
70,205 P.3d 1203, 1206 (2009). Contract interpretation cannot be done in a vacuum. Yet the 
Linfords do just that. The Linfords argue that because the word "loss" is in the ACV Paragraph, 
is absent in the RC Paragraph, and because the purpose of the Appraisal Paragraph is to 
determine the amount of "loss", the Appraisal Paragraph does not apply to the RC Paragraph. 
The Linfords' "interpretation" of the absence of the word "loss" in the RC Paragraph ignores its 
context, including the section heading, introductory paragraph, title to the paragraph of which it 
is a subparagraph and the modifYing sub-subparagraph following the RC Paragraph. All of these 
contain the word "loss". In context, the absence of the word "loss" does not exempt the dispute 
from appraisal. No reasonable interpretation of the policy can conclude that the RC Paragraph is 
not a paragraph designed to determine the amount of loss as referred to in the Appraisal 
Paragraph. 
Just as unreasonable is the Linfords' argument that the Letter Agreement is irrelevant to 
this appeal. 
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b. The June 2, 2010 Letter Agreement is the Operative Document for 
Determining the Amount Owed Under the Duty to IndemnifY. 
The Linfords' compare and contrast the language in the Appraisal Paragraph and the 
Letter Agreement and come to the astounding conclusion that other than the modification from 
three to one appraiser, they "are exactly the same." (Appellants' Brief, pp. 28-29.) Therefore, 
the Linfords continue, "only an examination of the language contained in the Appraisal 
Paragraph of the Policy is relevant to the current dispute" and since the Appraisal Paragraph only 
applies to ACV disputes, both the Letter Agreement and the Appraisal Paragraph are irrelevant. 
(Id. at p. 29.) It is through this tortured "logic" the Linfords distance themselves from their own 
agreements and contracts and claim they are not bound by the appraisal amount. 
The Letter Agreement cannot be ignored or compared away. It makes not one procedural 
modification, but a total of nine modifications to the Appraisal Paragraph and/or loss settlement 
provisions of the Policy, many of which are substantive. These include: 
- the parties agree to resolve and set the amount of loss under. 
Coverage A of the Policy by appraisal; 
- Mr. Berkson will determine the cost to repair damages to the 
dwelling, caused by the fire, as if he was a contractor on the date of 
loss (amount of loss); 
- Mr. Berkson will provide a written appraisal of the amount of 
loss to the insureds and State Farm; 
- the parties agree to be bound by the written appraisal .... 
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(R., p. 188.) (Emphasis added.) The Letter Agreement makes it clear that the end result of the 
appraisal process was to resolve the extant dispute between State Farm Fire and the Linfords. 17 It 
was to establish the amount of loss owed to the Linfords under Coverage A. The Letter 
Agreement required a written appraisal ofthe amount ofloss "to the insured", again emphasizing 
that the appraisal was to determine what was owed to the Linfords and thereby resolve the 
dispute between the parties. It sets forth the precise method that is to be used by the appraiser in 
determining the amount of loss. It is undisputed that the appraiser used that method. (R., p. 
189.) This method became the agreed upon loss settlement provision. The Linfords agreed to be 
bound by the written appraiser's determination of the amount owed under the Coverage A. State 
Farm Fire paid the additional amount owed as determined by the appraisal. The Linfords 
accepted the benefits of the process but now refuse to be bound by it. Instead, they ask the Court 
to relieve them of their agreements, rewrite the insurance policy and allow them to make State 
Farm Fire guarantors of any judgment entered in Dave's lawsuit. The Letter Agreement is a 
primary operative document. The Linfords' attempts to minimize, ignore or otherwise make this 
key document irrelevant are frivolous and unreasonable. 
Perhaps one of the most disingenuous arguments against being bound by the written 
appraisal is the Linfords' argument that the appraiser did not determine the amount of loss owed 
them, but instead determined "a different estimate of the actual cash value". (Appellants' Brief, 
17The Third Party Complaint by the Linfords against State Farm Fire makes it clear the 
extant dispute was over how much more, if any, the Linfords were entitled to receive for repairs 
ofthe fire damage to their house. (R., pp. 75-84.) 
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p. 31.) (quoting from Tr. p. 24.) First, ACV is at issue only until repairs are completed. Once 
repairs are completed the only amount at issue is replacement cost. It is undisputed ACV was 
paid and repairs were completed long before either the Letter Agreement or the appraisal. 
Consequently, at the time the Letter Agreement was signed and when the appraisal occurred, 
ACV was not, and could not be, at issue. To argue that the written appraisal determined a 
"different" ACV ignores their own Third Party Complaint describing the dispute, ignores the 
undisputed fact that repairs were completed, ignores the express provisions of the Letter 
Agreement and contorts the policy language beyond any reasonable interpretation. 
Second, based on their arguments on appeal it is now clear that the Linfords had no 
intention of being bound by the Letter Agreement or the appraisal results either before, during or 
after agreeing to participate. The Linfords state they decided to "go along with the appraisal" 
because: (1) they needed to comply with the following provision: "[n]o action shall be brought 
against [State Farm Fire] unless there has been compliance with the policy provision,,18; and (2) 
they got State Farm Fire to pay all costs and expenses of the appraisal. (Appellants' Brief, p. 28.) 
(See also, Tr. p. 24.) 
In other words, knowing they had already been paid ACV, and knowing repairs had been 
completed, and knowing the ACV Paragraph was no longer operative, and knowing they had 
accepted a supplemental payment after repairs were completed (which by definition could only 
be payment of replacement costs), and knowing the Letter Agreement was signed after repairs 
18This provision relates to an insured's ability to sue the insurer. Consequently, the 
Linfords agreed to appraisal in order to continue their suit against State Farm Fire. 
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were completed, and knowing the appraisal occurred after the repairs were completed, and 
accepting even more money as a result of the appraisal, the Linfords agreed to go along with an 
appraisal process they thought was unnecessary and irrelevant to the resolution of the actual 
dispute between State Farm Fire and them. The motives for going along with the appraisal are 
far more sinister when examined in the light of their own arguments - if State Farm Fire was 
willing to foot the bill for the unnecessary appraisal, it allowed them to continue their suit against 
State Farm Fire for breach of contract and bad faith. 
Third, at no time prior to the appraisal, not even at the time of negotiating the Letter 
Agreement modifications, did the Linfords inform State Farm Fire of their view that the appraisal 
was meaningless and/or was merely a necessary step to avoid dismissal of their action. This 
Court has held that if there is a concern regarding an alternative dispute resolution process at the 
time of contracting, and nothing is said or done to address that concern, the parties are 
nevertheless bound by the alternative dispute resolution results regardless of the validity of the 
concerns. See, Martel v. Bul/otti, 138 Idaho 451,196-7,65 P.3d 192,455-6 (2003) (The 
potential bias of the architect selected to settle the dispute was known at the time of contracting 
so the parties were bound by the contract dispute resolution process and result.) Here, the parties 
contracted to make modifications to the alternative dispute resolution process and to the loss 
settlement provisions in the insurance policy by Letter Agreement. The parties were already in a 
dispute over the amount owed. The Linfords had reservations/concerns about the appraisal 
process. Nevertheless, the Linfords agreed to appraisal as modified. Based on their silence, the 
Linfords are bound by the written appraisal and cannot now complain about the process or the 
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result. See JR. Simp/ot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 110,350 P.2d 211, 214 (1960). (This 
Court cannot make for the Linfords a better agreement than they themselves were satisfied to 
make.) 
The Linfords' hypothetical in their Briefpoints out the fallacy of their position regarding 
appraisal in the present matter. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 32-33.) The Linfords hypothesis is based 
on the following assumptions: (1) a friend repaired the fire damage but waived overhead and 
profit; (2) the Linfords only paid $150,000.00 under that arrangement; (3) this amount was 
challenged by State Farm Fire as too high; and (4) the appraiser found the cost of repairs to be 
$200,000.00. Based on these facts, the Linfords hypothesize that State Farm Fire would pay only 
$150,000.00 because that was all the Linfords actually paid. 
State Farm Fire's conduct in this case proves the hypothesis wrong. State Farm Fire did 
not ignore the appraisal award and choose a lower amount to pay. By their own admission, the 
Linfords have only paid Dave's $173,369.99 under the Fire Damage Contract. (R., pp. 53; 176; 
343-344.) Under the Linfords' hypothesis and interpretation of the policy, State Farm Fire could 
have paid this amount as the amount actually and necessarily spent to repair fire damage at the 
time of the appraisal. It paid, however, the higher appraisal amount. State Farm Fire complied 
with its agreement to be bound by the appraisal. The only parties who have failed to live up to 
their agreement is the Linfords. 
The Linfords have contracted away their right to challenge either the appraisal process or 
the appraiser's decision except on limited grounds not raised below or on appeal. Nevertheless, 
the Linfords have done exactly what they contracted away - challenge its application to them. 
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The Linfords are bound by the results ofthe appraisal and to say otherwise is frivolous and 
unsupportable. 
c. The Linfords' Reliance on Kane is Misplaced. J9 
The Linfords argue the district court's indemnity holding should be overturned based on a 
so-called "admission" made by State Farm Fire in a class action filed in a foreign jurisdiction 
(Pennsylvania). (Appellants' Brief, p. 34.) (citing Kane v. State Farm Fire, et a!., 841 A.2d 1038 
(Penn. 2003).) Kane is unpersuasive and irrelevant to this appeal and, worst of all, the 
"admission" was not made by State Farm Fire. 
First, the Kane case dealt with a different policy provision (ACV) and a different issue 
(deducting depreciation from actual cash value) at a different point in the repair process (before 
repairs had been completed). This precludes Kane's use against State Farm Fire in this case. 
Second, the Linfords rely on the following as the "admission" made in the Kane case: 
Finally, Kane noted that "there is no concern ... that the insured 
will not be made whole" because State Farm has "conceded 
liability for replacement costs once Appellants undertake to repair 
or replace the damage to their properties." (Id. at 1050) (emphasis 
added). In the present case, State Farm is essentially retracting its 
admission in Kane. 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 35.) Kane is a class action lawsuit against nine insurance companies. (Id., 
at 1038.) State Farm Fire was only one of those nine insurance companies. (Id.) The Kane court 
put the insurance companies into two groups based on the similarity of the policy language. 
State Farm Fire was in "group one". (Id. at 1042.) The admission the Linfords lifted from Kane 
J9 A copy ofthe Kane decision is attached to the Addendum hereto as Exhibit C. 
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and attributed to State Farm Fire comes from that part of the decision examining policies issued 
by "group two" (Allstate, Metropolitan, Ace Fire and Markel). (Id. at 1050.) Not only do the 
Linfords' misapply Kane, the so called admission is not even an admission by State Farm Fire. 
This is the epitome of the frivolous, unreasonable and unsupportable nature of the Linfords' 
appeal. 20 
3. The District Court Did Not Err in Dismissing the Breach of Implied 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Bad Faith Causes of Action. 
If the dismissal of the breach of contract cause of action is upheld, neither the breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing or the bad faith causes of action survive. 
a. The Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Cause of Action is Duplicative. 
The Linfords claim that the district court erred in dismissing the breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing cause of action "[gJiven State Farm's actions and the admissions in 
Kane." (Appellants' Brief, p. 38.) As discussed above, State Farm Fire's actions in not 
providing a defense to the allegations in Dave's Complaint or providing additional payment 
under the fire loss property provisions is not a breach of contract, express or implied. Moreover, 
the so-called admission in Kane upon which the Linfords base yet another cause of action is not a 
binding admission or even an admission made by State Farm Fire. The appeal from dismissal of 
this cause of action is without support. Indeed, appeal from the dismissal of this cause of action 
is frivolous and unreasonable in the face of clear Idaho law. 
2°The Linfords not only used this inapplicable "admission" as a basis for alleging a breach 
of contract, they argue "it also establishes that State Farm is acting in bad faith." (Id.) 
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In Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,824 P.2d 841 
(1991), this Court ruled that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not 
a stand alone cause of action, separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim: 
A violation ofthe implied covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result 
in a cause of action separate from the breach of contract claims, nor does it result 
in separate contract damages, unless such damages specifically relate to the breach 
of the good faith covenant. To hold otherwise would result in a duplication of 
damages awarded for a breach of the same contract. 
Id. at 289,824 P.2d at 864; see also Smith v. Meridian Joint School District #2, 128 Idaho 714, 
721, 918 P .2d 583, 590 (1986).21 Regardless of whether this Court upholds dismissal of the 
breach of contract cause of action, the dismissal of this cause of action should be upheld because 
it cannot be a separate cause of action, as a matter of law. 
b. The District Court Correctly Dismissed the Bad Faith Cause of Action. 
If the Court agrees that State Farm Fire did not owe a duty to defend and has fully paid 
for fire loss damages, then there is no breach of the insurance contract. Ifthere is no breach of 
contract, there cannot be bad faith, as a matter of law. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 137 Idaho 173, 179,45 P.3d 829,835 (2002). 
4. The Linfords are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
The Linfords seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) and (4) 
and Idaho Code § 12-123. The Linfords have failed to provide any argument, basis or support for 
an award of attorney fees under either Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) or Idaho Code § 12-123. No 
21This same Idaho case law was presented to the Linfords in the district court, yet they 
refuse to take heed. 
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attorney fees on appeal should be considered for the Linfords under either of these statutes. See 
LA.R., Rule 35(a)(5). 
The Linfords also seek attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 41-1839(1) based on 
State Farm Fire's refusal to accept the Linfords' tenders of the defense of Dave's lawsuit within 
thirty days. (Appellants' Brief, p. 9.) The Linfords argue that these tenders triggered the duty to 
defend and entitled the Linfords to the defense costs they incurred defending that action. First, 
any such request is premature since there has been no determination that State Farm Fire owes 
any amount to the Linfords. 
Second, breach of the duty to defend allows the insured to seek attorney fees as damages 
for breach of contract and not as statutory attorney fees under Idaho Code § 41-183 9( 1). See 
Deluna v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 149 Idaho 81, 86, 233 P.3d 12, 17 (2008). The 
Linfords cannot double dip and seek attorney fees as damages and also seek them under Idaho 
Code § 41-1839(1). 
Of course, the fact that the Respondents are merely attempting to uphold the district 
court's dismissal of all causes of action would be a further ground for denying the Linfords 
attorney fees on appeal. 
5. State Farm Fire is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
State Farm Fire requests that it be awarded attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-183 9(4). This statute provides authority for an award of attorney 
fees when this Court finds that the appeal was "brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Id. Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) provides a basis for an 
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award of attorney fees to either the insured or the insurer. Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 
Idaho 705, 711, 979 P.2d 107, 113 (1999). A case is considered frivolously appealed "if the law 
is well settled and the appellants have made no substantial showing that the district court 
misapplied the law." Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148 
(1999). Here, the law regarding the duties to defend and indemnify is well settled and was 
correctly applied by the district court. 
An award of fees is also appropriate where an appeal presents no meaningful issue on a 
question of law but simply invites the appellate court to second guess the district court on 
conflicting evidence. Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 828, 41 
P.3d 242,256 (2001). The evidence that State Farm Fire owed a duty to defend or owed more 
than the appraisal amount does not even rise to the level of conflicting evidence. The appeal is 
instead a request of this Court to second guess the district court's application of undisputed facts 
and its interpretation of the contracts and to overturn well established law without any good 
reason for doing so. State Farm Fire is entitled to fees and costs on appeal because it was 
brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably and/or without foundation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The district court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm Fire should be affirmed. 
The district court's denial of the Linfords' motion for partial summary judgment should be 
ignored. The Linfords' request for attorney fees on appeal should be denied and State Farm 
Fire's request should be granted. 
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DATED this -!i- day of January, 2012. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ie!' day of January, 2012, I caused a true and correct 
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David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Law Chartered 
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Neil D. McFeeley 
Corey J. Rippee 
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow 
& McKlveen, Chartered 
P.O. Box 1368 
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Dupont Operations Center 
P.O. Box 5000 
Dupont, Washington 98327-5000 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I am custodian of the 
records pertaining to the issuance of policies issued by 
state Farm Fire and Casualty Company of Bloomington, IL 
that are processed by the Personal Lines Fire Division of the 
Dupont operations Center, Dupont Washington. 
Based on our available records, I further certify that the attached 
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the policy provisions and coverages as of Jan 18, 2007 
for policy 12-BX-7416-6 issued to Linford, D Richard & Lindsey 
Sea Moore 
Un erwriting Team Manager 
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This policy is one of the broadest forms available today, and provides you with outstanding value for your insurance dollars. 
However, we want to point out that every policy contains limitations and exclusions. Please read your policy carefully, 
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We agree to provide the insurance described in this policy: 
1. based on your payment of premium for the coverages you 
chose; 
2. based on your compliance with all applicable provisions 
of this policy; and 
3. in reliance on your statements in these Declarations. 
You agree, by acceptance of this policy, that: 
1. you will pay premiums when due and comply with the 
provisions of the policy; 
2. the statements in these Declarations are your state-
ments and are true; 
3. we insure you on the basis your statements are true; and 
4. this policy contains all of the agreements between you 
and us and any of our agents. 
Unless otherwise indicated in the application, you state that 
during the three years preCeding the time of your application 
for this insurance your Loss History and Insurance History 
are as follows: 
1. Loss History: you have not had any losses, insured or 
not; and 
2. Insurance History: you have not had any insurer or 
agency cancel or refuse to issue or renew similar insur-
ance to you or any household member. 
DEFINITIONS 
"You" and "your" mean the "named insured" shown in the 
Declarations. Your spouse is included if a resident of your 
household. 'We", "us' and ·our" mean the Company shown 
in the Declarations. 
Certain words and phrases are defined as follows: 
1. "bodily injury" means physical injury, sickness, or dis-
ease to a person. This includes required care, loss of 
services and death resulting therefrom. 
Bodily injury does not include: 
a. any of the following which are communicable: dis-
ease. bacteria, parasite, virus, or other organism, any 
of which are transmitted by any insured to any other 
person; 
b. the exposure to any such disease, bacteria, parasite, 
virus, or other organism by any insured to any other 
person; or 
C. emotional distress, mental anguish, humiliation, 
mental distress, mental injury, or any similar injury 
unless it arises out of actual physical injury to some 
person. 
2. "business· means a trade, profession or occupation. 
This includes farming. 
3. "Declarations· means the policy Declarations, any 
amended Declarations, the most recent renewal notice 
or certificate, an Evidence of Insurance form or any 
endorsement changing any of these. 
4. "insured" means you and, if residents of your household: 
a. your relatives; and 
b. any other person under the age of 21 who is in the 
care of a person described above. 
Under Section II, "insured" also means: 
c. with respect to animals or watercraft to which this 
policy applies, the person or organization legally 
responsible for them. However, the animal or water-
craft must be owned by you or a person included in 
4.a. or 4.b. A person or organization using or having 
custody of these animals or watercraft in the course 
of a business, or withoul permission of the owner, is 











d. with respect to any vehicle to which this policy ap-
plies, any person while engaged in your employment 
or the employment of a person included in 4.a. or 4.b. 
5. "insured location" means: 
a. the residence premises; 
b. the part of any other premises, other structures and 
grounds used by you as a residence. This includes 
premises, structures and grounds you acquire while 
this policy is in effect for your use as a residence; 
c. any premises used by you in connection with the 
premises included in 5.a. or S.b.; 
d. any part of a premises not owned by an insured but 
where an insured is temporarily res!ding; 
e. land owned by or rented to an insured on which a 
one or two family dwelling is being constructed as a 
residence for an insured; 
f. individual or family cemetery plots or burial vaults 
owned by an insured; 
g. any part of a premises occasionally rented to an 
insured for other than business purposes; 
h. vacant land owned by or rented to an insured. This 
does not include farm land; and 
i. farm land (without buildings), rented or held for rental 
to others, but not to exceed a total of SOO acres, 
regardless of the number of locations. 
6. "motor vehicle", when used in Section" of this policy, 
means: 
a. a motorized land vehicle designed for travel on public 
roads or subject to motor vehicle registration. A mo-
torized land vehicle in dead storage on an insured 
location is not a motor vehicle; 
b. a trailer or sem.Hrailer designed for travel on public 
roads and subject to motor vehicle registration. A 
boat, camp, home or utility traiter not being towed by 
2 
or carried on a vehicle included in 6.a. is not a motor 
vehicle; 
c. a motorized golf cart. snowmobile, motorized bicycle, 
motorized tricycle, all-terrain vehicle or any other 
similar type equipment owned by an insured and 
designed or used for recreational or utility purposes 
off public roads, while off an insured location. A 
motorized golf cart while used for golfing purposes is 
not a motor vehicle; and 
d. any vehicle while being towed by or carried on a 
vehicle inc/uded in 6.a., B.b. or S.c. 
7. "occurrence", when used in Section II of this policy, 
means an accident, including exposure to conditions. 
which results in: 
a. bodily injury; or 
b. property damage; 
during the policy period. Repeated or continuous expo-
sure to the same general conditions is considered to be 
one occurrence. 
8. "property damage" means physical damage to or de-
struction of tangible property, including loss of use of this 
property. Theft or conversion of property by any insured 
is not property damage. 
9. "residence employee" means an employee of an in-
sured who performs duties. including househOld or do-
mestic services, in connection with the maintenance or 
use of the residence premises. This includes employ-
ees who perform similar duties elsewhere for you. This 
does not include employees while performing duties in 
connection with the business of an insured. 
10. "residence premises" means: 
a. the one, two, three or four·family dwelling, other 
structures and grounds; or 
b. that part of any other building; 





loss is the direct and immediate cause of the collapse of 
Ihe building. 
This coverage does not increase the limit applying to the 
damaged property. 
12. Locks. We will pay the reasonable expenses you incur 
to re-key locks on exterior doors of the dwelling located 
on the residence premises, when the keys to those 
locks are a part of a covered theft loss. 
No deductible applies to this coverage. 
INFLATION COVERAGE 
The limits of liability shown in the Declarations for Cover-
age A, Coverage B and, when applicable, Option 10 will be 
increased at the same rate as the increase in the Inflation 
Coverage Index shown in the Declarations. 
To find the limits on a given date: 
1. divide the Index on that date by the Index as of the 
effective date of this Inflation Coverage provision; then 
2. multiply the resulting factor by the limits of liability for 
Coverage A, Coverage B and Option 10 separately. 
The limits of liability will not be reduced to less ,than the 
amounts shown in the Declarations. 
If during the term of this policy the Coverage A limit of liability 
is changed at your request, the effective date of this Inflation 
Coverage provision is changed to coincide with the effective 
date of such change. 
SECTION I - LOSSES INSURED 
COVERAGE A - DWELLING 
We insure for accidental direct physical loss to the property 
described in Coverage A, except as provided in SECTION I· 
LOSSES NOT INSURED. 
COVERAGE B • PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We insure for accidEmtal direct physical loss to property 
described in Coverage B caused by the following perils, 
except as provided in SECTION I· LOSSES NOT INSURED: 
1. Fire or lightning. 
2. Windstorm or hail. This peril does not include loss to 
property contained in a building caused by rain, snow, 
sleet, sand or dust. This limitation does not apply when 
the direct force of wind or hail damages the building 
causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain, snow, 
sleet, sand or dust enters through this opening. 
This peril includes loss to watercraft of all types and their 
trailers, furnishings, equipment, and outboard motors, 
only while inside a fully enclosed building. 
3. Explosion. 
4. Riot or civil commotion. 
5. Aircraft, including self-propelled missiles and space-
craft. 
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6. Vehicles, meaning impact by a vehicle. 
7. Smoke. meaning sudden and accidental damage from 
smoke. 
This peril does not include loss caused by smoke from 
agricultural smudging or industrial operations. 
8. Vandalism or malicious mischief, meaning only willful 
and malicious damage to or destruction of property. 
9. Theft, including attempted theft and loss of property from 
a known location when it is probable that the property has 
been stolen. 
This peril does not include: 
a. loss of a precious or semi-precious stone from its 
setting; 
b. loss caused by theft: 
(1) committed by an Insured or by any other person ,: 
regularly residing on the insured location. Prop- • 
erty of a student who is an insured is covered I 
while located at a residence away from home, if 1 
the theft is committed by a person who is not an ,I 
insured; . 
(2) in or to a dwelling under construction or of mate-
rials and supplies for use in the construction until 
the dwelling is completed and occupied; or 








b, defecl. weakness, inadequacy, fault or unsoundness 
in: 
(1) planning, zoning, development, surveying, siting; 
(2) design, specifications, workmanship. construc-
tion, grading. compaction; 
, (3) materials used in construction or repair; or 
(4) maintenance; 
of any property (including land, structures, or im· I 
provements of any kind) whether on or off the resi- I 
dence premises; or \ 
! 
c. weather conditions. 
However, we do insure for any resulting loss from items 
a., b. and c. unless the resulting loss is itself a Loss Not 
Insured by this Section. I 
SECTION I • LOSS SETTLEMENT I 
Only the Loss Settlement provisions shown in the Declara-
tions apply. We will settle covered property losses according 
to the following. 
COVERAGE A - DWELLING 
1. A1- Replacement Cost Loss Settlement· 
Similar Construction. 
a. We will pay the cost to repair or replace with similar 
construction and for the same use on the premises 
shown in the Declarations. the damaged part of the 
property covered under SECTION I- COVERAGES, 
COVERAGE A • DWELLING, except for wood 
fences, subject to ihe following: 
(1) until actual repair or replacement is completed, 
we will pay only the actual cash value at the time 
of the loss of the damaged part of the property, 
up to the applicable limit of liability shown in the 
Declarations, not to exceed the cost to repair or 
replace the damaged part of the property; 
(2) when the repair or replacement is actuallY com-
pleted, we will pay the covered additional amount 
you actually and necessarily spend to repair or 
replace the damaged part of the property, or an 
amount up to the applicable limit of liability shown 
in the Declarations, whichever is less; 
(3) to receive any additional payments on a replace-
ment cost basis, you must complete the actual 
repair or replacement of the damaged part of the 
property within two years after the date of loss, 
and notify us within 30 days after the work has 
been completed; and 
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(4) we will not pay for increased costs resulting from 
enforcement of any ordinance or law regulating 
the construction, repair or demolition of a building 
, or other structure, except as provided under Op-
tion OL - Building Ordinance or Law Cover-
age. 
b. Wood Fences: We will pay the actual cash value at 
the time at loss tor loss or damage to wood fences, 
not to exceed the limit of liability shown in the Decla-
rations for COVERAGE A - DWELLING EXTEN-
SION. 
2. A2 • Replacement Cost Loss Settlement -
Common Construction. 
a. We will pay the cost to repair or replace with common 
construction and for the same use 00 the premises 
shown in the Declarations, the damaged part of the 
property covered under SECTION I· COVERAGES, 
COVERAGE A • DWELLING, except for wood 



















(1) we will pay only for repair or replacement of the \ 
damaged part of the property with common con-
struction techniques and materials commonly ! 
used by the building trades in standard new 
construction. We will not pay the cost to repair or 
replace obsolete, antique or custom construction 
with like kind and quality; 
(2) until actual repair or replacement is completed, 
we will pay only the actual cash value at the time 
01 the loss of the damaged part of the property, 
up to the applicable limit of liability shown in the 





4. Appraisal. If you and we fail to agree on the amount of 
loss. either one can demand that the amount of the loss 
be set by appraisal. If either makes a written demand for 
appraisal, each shall select a competent, disinterested 
appraiser. Each shall notify the other of the appraiser's 
Identity within 20 days of receipt of the written demand. 
The two appraisers shall then select a competent, impar-
tial umpire. If the two appraisers are unable to agree upon 
an umpire within 15 days, you or we can ask a judge of 
a court of record in the state where the residence prem-
ises is located to select an umpire. The appraisers shall 
then set the amount of the loss. If the appraisers submit 
a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed 
upon shall be the amount of the loss. If the appraisers fail 
to agree within a reasonable time, they shall submit their 
differences to the umpire. Written agreement signed by 
any two of these three shall set the amount of the loss. 
Each appraiser shall be paid by the party selecting that 
appraiser. Other expenses of the appraisal and the com-
pensation of the umpire shall be paid equally by you and 
us. 
5. Other Insurance. If a loss covered by this policy is also 
covered by other insurance, we will pay only our share of 
the loss. Our share is the proportion of the loss that the 
applicable limit under this policy bears to the total amount 
of insurance covering the loss. 
6. Suit Against Us. No action shall be brought unless there 
has been compliance with the policy provisions. The 
action must be started within one year after the date of 
loss or damage. 
7. Our Option. We may repair or replace any part of the 
property damaged or stolen with similar property. Any 
property we pay for or replace becomes our property. 
8. Loss Payment. We will adjust all losses with you. We will 
pay you unless some other person is named in the policy 
or is legally entitled to receive payment. Loss wilt be 
payable 60 days after we receive your proof of loss and: 
a. reach agreement with you; 
b. there is an entry of a final judgment; or 
c. there is a filing of an appraisal award with us. 
9. Abandonment of Property. We need not accept any 
property abandoned by an insured. 
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10. Mortgage Clause. The word "mortgagee" includes trus-
tee. 
a. If a mortgagee is named in this policy, any loss 
payable under Coverage A shall be paid to the mort-
gagee and you, as interests appear. If more than one 
mortgagee is named, the order of payment shall be 
the same as the order of precedence of the mort-
gages. 
b. If we deny your claim, that denial shall not <'pply to a 
valid claim of the mortgagee. if the mortgagee: 
(1) notifies us of any change in ownership, occu-
pancy or substantial change in risk of which the 
mortgagee is aware; 
(2) pays on demand any premium due under this 
policy, if you have not paid the premium; and 
(3) submits a signed, sworn statement of loss within 
60 days after receiving notice from us of your 
failure to do so. Policy conditions relating to Ap-
praisal, Suit Against Us and loss Payment apply 
to the mortgagee. 
c. If this policy is cancelled by us, the mortgagee shall 
be notified at least 10 days before the date cancella-
tion takes effect. Proof of mailing shall be proof of 
notice. . 
d. If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny 
payment to you: 
(1) we are subrogated to all the rights of the mortga-
gee granted under the mortgage on the property; 
or 
(2) at our option, we may pay to the mortgagee the 
whole principal on the mortgage plus any accrued 
interest. In this event, we shall receive a full 
aSSignment and transfer of the mortgage and all 
securities held as collateral to the mortgage debt. 
e. Subrogation shall not impair the right of the mortga-
gee to recover the full amount of the mortgagee's 
claim. 
11. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize an assign-
ment or grant coverage for the benefit of a person or 











a fee, This applies regardless of any other provision of 
this policy. 
12. Intentional Acts. If you or any person insured under this 
policy causes or procures a loss to property covered 
under this policy for the purpose of obtaining insurance 
benefits, then this policy is void and we will not pay you 
or any other insured for this loss. 
SECTION II - LIABILITY COVERAGES 
COVERAGE L • PERSONAL LIABILITY 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for 
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to 
which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, we 
will: 
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which 
the insured is legally liable; and 
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our 
choice. We may make any investigation and settle any 
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation 
to 'defend any claim Qr suit ends when the amount we pay 
for damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment 
resulting from the occurrence. equals our limit of liability. 
COVERAGE M· MEDICAL PAYMENTS TO OTHERS 
We will pay the 'necessary medical expenses incurred or 
medically ascertained within three years from the date of an 
accident causing bodily injury. Medical expenses means 
reasonable charges fOr medical, surgical, x-ray, dental, am-
bulance. hospital, professional nursing, prosthetic devices 
and funeral services. This coverage applies only: 
1. to a person on the insured location with the permission 
of an insured; , 
2. to a person off the insured location, if the bodily injury: 
a. arises out of a condition on the insured location or 
the ways immediately adjoining; 
b. is caused by the activities of an insured; 
c. is caused by a residence employee in the course of 
the residence employee's employment by an in-
sured; or 
d. is caused by an animal owned by or in the care of an 
insured; or 
3. to a residence employee if the occurrence causing 
bodily injury occurs off the insured location and arises 
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out of or in the course of the residence employee's 
employment by an Insured. . 
SECTION II· ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
We cover the following in addition to the limits of liability: 
1. Claim Expenses. We pay: 
a. expenses we incur and costs taxed against an in- i 
sured in suits we defend; i 
! 
b. premiums on bonds required in suits we defend, but I 
not for bond amounts greater than the Coverage l I 
limit. We are not obligated to apply for or furnish any I 
bond; 
c. reasonable expenses an insured incurs at our re- . 
quest. This includes actual loss of earnings (but not I 
loss of other income) up to $100 per day for aiding us 
in the investigation or defense of claims or suits; I 
d. prejudgment interest awarded against the insured 
on that part of the judgment we pay; and 
, ' , 
e. interest on the entire judgment which accrues after 
entry of the judgment and before we payor tender, I 
or deposit in court that part of the judgment which 
does not exceed the limit of liability that applies. l 
2. First Aid Expenses. We will pay expenses for first aid to I 
others incurred by an insured for bodily injury covered 1 
under this policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any 
other insured. I 
3. Damage to Property of Others. I 
a. We will pay for property damage to property of , 
others caused by an insured. 
I 
b. We will not pay more than the smallest of the following I 
amounts: ; 
(1) replacement cost at the time of loss; 
(2) full cost of repair; or 
FP-7955 , 




does not apply to property damage caused by fire, 
smoke or explosion; 
d. bodily injury to a person eligible to receive any 
benefits required to be provided or voluntarily pro-
vided by an insured under a workers' compensation, 
non·occupational disability, or occupational disease 
law; 
e. bodily injury or property damage for which an 
insured under this policy is also an insured under a 
nuclear energy liability policy or would be an insured 
but for its termination upon exhaustion of its limit of 
. liability. A nuclear energy liability policy is a policy 
issued by Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Asso-
ciation, Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters, 
Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada, or any of 
their successors. 
3. Coverage M does not apply to bodily injury: 
a. to a residence employee if it occurs off the insured 
location and does not arise out of or in the course of 
the residence employee's employment by an in-
sured; 
b. to a person eligible to receive any benefits required 
to be provided or voluntarily provided under any 
workers' compensation, non-occupational disability 
or occupational disease law; 
c. from nuclear reaction, radiation or radioactive con-
tamination, all whether controlled or uncontrolled or 
however caused, or any consequence of any of 
these; 
d. to a person other than a residence employee of an 
insured, regularly residing on any part of the insured 
location. 
SECTION II « CONDITIONS 
1. Limit of Liability. The Coverage llimit is shown in the 
Declarations. This is our limit for all damages from each 
occurrence regardless of the number of Insureds, 
claims made or persons injured. 
The Coverage M limit is shown in the Declarations. This 
is our limit for all medical expense for bodily injury to 
one person as the result of one accident. 
2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance applies sepa-
rately to each insured. This condition shall not increase 
our limit of liability for anyone occurrence. 
3. Duties After Loss. In case of an accident or occurrence, 
the insured shall perform the following duties that apply. 
You shall cooperate with us in seeing that these duties 
are performed: 
a. give written notice to us or our agent as soon as 
practicable. which sets forth: 
(1) the identity of this policy and insured; 
(2) reasonably available information on the time. 
place and cirCUmstances of the accident or oc-
currence; and 
18 
(3) names and addresses of any claimants and avail-
able witnesses; 
b. immediately forward to us every notice, demand, 
summons or other process relating to the accident or 
occurrence; 
c. at our request, assist in: 
(1) making settlement; 
(2) the enforcement of any right of contribution or 
indemnity against a person or organization who 
may be liable to an insured; 
(3) the conduct of suits and attend hearings and 
trials; and 
(4) securing and giving evidence and obtaining the 
attendance of witnesses; 
d. under the coverage· Damage to Property of Oth-
ers, exhibit the damaged property if within the in-
sured's control; and 
e. the insured shall not, except at the insured's own 
cost, voluntarily make payments, assume obligations 
or incur expenses. This does not apply to expense 
for first aid 10 others at the time of the bodily injury. 








state Farm Fire and Casualty Company 
PO Box 5000 
Dupont, WA 98327-5000 
M-15- 1327-F495 F H 
LINFORD, D RICHARD & LINDSEY 
2241 E GOSSAMER LN 
BOISE ID 83106-6141 
1I1,1",11.lmll 1111111111111111111,11,11111 t.l1,I",III,I,,1 
Location: Same as Mailing Address 
Loss Settlement Provisions (See Polley) 
A 1 Replacement Cost - Similar Construction 
B1 Limited Replacement Cost· Coverage B 
Forms, Options, and Endorsements 
Homeowners Policy 
Jewelry and Furs $2,5001$5,000 
Increase Dwlg up to $58 400 
OrdinancelLaw 10%1 $29,200 
Amendatory Endorsement 
Policy Endorsement 
Fungus (Including Mold) Excl 
Back-Up DwelllListed Property 
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Homeowners pOlicy I 
JUL 08 2006 to JUL 08 2007 j 
TO BE PAID BY MORTGAGEE 




B Personal Property 
C Loss of Use 
Deductibles - Section I 
All Losses 
Section II 
L Personal Liability 
Up To 
Damage to Property of Others 





Claim Free Discount 



























This policy does not provide earthquake coverage. If you are interested in obtaining earthquake coverage, 
please contact your State Farm agent for more information concerning the coverage and eligibility 
criteria. 
TkIsp.~(4f~~. lue~~(bJc ~~~. 
8450 4011 I Agent ANGELA ~ea 'INs AGENCY INC 
N 1V,E9,G2 TAIAnhnnA (:;>08) ~4:>.77:>R 
SFF-UN 01570 
If you have mc+:alease contact your agent. 
See reverse side for important information. 




PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
Loan No: 0024191983 
PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
Loan No: 0024191991 
Your coverage amount ... 
CONTINUED FROM FRONT 
SFF-LIN 01571 
It is up to you to choose the coverages and limits that meet your needs. We recommend that you purchase a ooverage limit 
equal to the estimated replacement cost of your home. Replacement cost estimates are available from building contractors and 
replacement cost appraisers, or, your agent can provide an estimate from Xaotware, Inc~ using information you provide about 
your home. We can accept the type of estimate you ohoose as long as it provides a reasonable level of detail about your home. 
State Farm8 does not guarantee that any estimate will be the actual future oost to rebuild your home. Higher limits are available 
at higher premiums. Lower limits are also available, which if selected may make certain coverages unavailable to you. We 
encourage you to periodically review your coverages and limits with your agent and to notify us of any changes or additions to 
your home. 
Discounts and Rating· The longer you are insured with State Farm~ and the fewer claims you have, the lower your premium. 
For policyholders insured by State Farm for three or more years, the Claim Free Discount Plan provides a premium discount if 
you have not had any claims considered for the Plan in the most recent three-year period since becoming insured with State 
Farm. Premium adjustments under the Claim Record Rating Plan are based on the number of years you have been insured with 
State Farm and on the number of claims that we consider for the Plan. Depending on the Plan(s) that applies in your 
state/province, claims considered for the Plans generally include claims resulting in a paid loss and may include weather-related 
claims. Additionally, depending on your state/province's plan and your tenure with State Farm, any olaims with your prior insurer 
resulting in property damage or injury may also influenoe your premium. For further information about whether a Claim Free 
Discount is in effect in your state/province, the Claim Record Rating Plan that applies in your state/province, and the claims we 
consider for the Plans, please contact your State Farm agent. 
NonCE TO POUCYHOLDER: 
For a comprehensive description of coverages and forms, please refer to your policy. 
Policy changes requested before the "Date Prepared", which appear on this notice, are effective on the Renewal Date of this 
policy unless otherwise indicated by a separate endorsement, binder, or amended declarations. Any coverage forms attached 
to this notice are also effective on the Renewal Date of this policy. 
Policy changes requested after the "Date Prepared" will be sent to you as an amended declarations or as an endorsement to 
your policy. Billing for any additional premium for such changes will be mailed at a later date. 
If, during the past year, you've acquired any valuable property items, made any improvements to insured property, or have any 
questions about your insurance coverage, contact your State Farm agent. 




JAMES D. LaRUE 
251 En~t I:ront Slreet, Suite. 300 
Post Olliec Box 1539 
Boise, Idrlho 83701 
Tdcphont' 208 343-5454 
Fax 208 384·5844 
E-mail Jdl@cll1ll1burkc.com 
Neil. D. McFee ley 
EBERLE, .I3E~LIN, KADING, TURNl30W 
& MCKL.VEEN,O·IARTERED 
Illl West JeffersonStl'eet. Suite530 
P.O. Box 1368 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
June 2,2010 
l~e:: i)Q)Ii'/: :s' fire;v. Lin/bNI V .. SteNe fi'(/tifl Fir'! 
E&B NQ. 1-1.267 
. ........ ;_ELAM&BURKE=:::::::::: .. ::. 
ATTORNEYS AT tAW 
lll~ purpose of this. letter is .toconfirm an agreementbetweeJi D. Rich~ll'(lal)d l.il1dscy 
Linfon:l ("inSlJl'eds") and State Farm Fire and GasualtyColnpany(,LStale. Fatmi)coHe¢tively 
C'the parties") r~gardi'ng the insuredsl ' claims that Slate Farm has not paid the anlQuntQf loss 
claimed under Coverage A of their Homeowners polic:y.,PoIicy NQ. 12':BX-7416'-6, ("(he 
Policy") relating to the fii'e loss of J'8I1uary .17, 2001 ~ at 2241E. Gossal11erLn., B()ise,Jdaho:. 
ft is my understanding that the insureds claimed benefits tll1derCoverag~ A (Dwelling), 
Coverage n (Personal Pl\jp~tty) anJ C(/vcI:agc C (Loss ofU::,e). h is also myt:nJerstulldfllg. that 
there are no disputes between the insureds and Stale FarJ11l'egarding payments made by State 
Farm under Coverages Band C. It is tluther my understanding lhat the insureds bave received 
payment ~lOder Coverage A in the amount of $197,065.67. The insureds entered into two 
contracts with Dave's Inc.: one contract tor repC!ir of the fire damag.c, and another contract tor 
remodel of the dwelling. A dispute has arisen between Dave's Inc. nnd the insureds which 
resulted in a lawsuit being tiled. by Dave's Inc. 011 behalf of the insureds, your I1rm filed a thil'd-
party complhint against State Farlll. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, by letter dated May 7, 2010, on behal f of State Farm, 
I demanded that the amount of the loss under Covcmgc A be set/det~\,ll1ined by appraisal. The 
insureds have elected not to appoirlt a separate appraiscl', but havc agJ'ecd:to modit)1 Section I .' 
Conditions, paragraph 4 - Appraisal - to the following terms: 
EXHIBIT B 
OO(]Ufiibit A 
Neil D. ,McFeeley 
Jlili·e··2;~·2U·1··n::~:::·~::::::,:··'··:·'~::··~~::~::~::.:'::~::::.: ....... :.--
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---_ .. _ ... _-'---_ .. __ .. _---
- the parties agree to resolve and set thcal110unt of loss lmdel' Coverage A of the Policy 
by appraisal; 
- the padies,will jOintly appoint Mike .Bel'kson as their appraisel'; 
-the. illsuredsalld State Farm will be allowed to pl'Ovicle Mr. Berkson. documeJits and 
information fOl' his cOllsi(feratioll.; 
- sho~t1d MI', Be.tks(Hlhav¢ questions 9r require additional.intbrmatiOll, he should shl,ll'e 
stI,ch inquideswith both l?l.lrties~ 
- the il1$llredswill alloW Mr, Berl<~on accessto the. insured d'wellrt1g~ifl:cq(les~ed~ft)r 
purp(Jses Vf p~rtonHing his appraisal; 
- Mr,. Berk~()n will determine the cost. to I-epail' damagestQ the dweHiilg, ca\l.s~d by the, 
fil'e,.as ifhe WaS a contractoronthedateofioss(amouilt oflqss);, 
- Mr. Berkson wiH provide' a wdttenapprnisal oftil,eal1)()tllH of loss. to the insureds and 
State Faml;' 
.~ the parties agtee tQ be hound by the wri,tten apPJ~nisuf;~nd 
.. State Ful'm will pay Mr, B¢rksQllte,¢S, fll1dexpenscs tlS t.he parties' joint appraiser, 
Theirjsur~dSijrl<J State Farlli ?lgrc~ to SlUyauy f1.1I;ther proceedings on the thil'd~ptll'ty 
complnint 1I1llilthcappI'ohmi is c()ll1pl~tedi 
If yOli tlgl'ee,JQ II)\! above~ kindly indfcateby signing andrettltlling the original of thil:! 
I¢tlet~ Ol'r b¢hnllpfyoul'cnel1ts~ . . . 
Very tnily YOlU'S, 
ELAM&.. BURKE. 
A Pi'()lessiO/wl Associaiion 
~~~ 
James D,. LaRlie: 
JDL:sd 
~~dfl('· .--
N~il ii M{;fccl~y-'-- --------




841 A.2d 1038,2003 PA Super 502 
(Cite as: 841 A.2d 1038) 
H 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania. 
William KANE and Dorothy Kane, his wife, William 
Mellinger, Noel Weiss, Michael Foster and Merrilee 
Foster, his wife, Keith McCall, Epiphaniana Beckham, 
AdnanJaffar, Michael Raffaele and Margaret Muller, 
Vincent Carcia and Christine Carcia, his wife, James 
Miller and Elizabeth Miller, His Wife, on their own 
behalf and as representatives of similarly situated 
persons, Appellants, 
v. 
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Allstate Insurance Company, Metropolitan Property and 
Casualty Insurance Company, Ace American Insurance 
Company, Ace Fire Underwriters Insurance Company, 
Markel American Insurance Company, One Beacon 
Insurance d/b/a Pennsylvania General Insurance 
Company, Keystone Insurance Company and Erie 
Insurance Company, Appellees. 
Argued May 22, 2003. 
Filed Dec. 22, 2003. 
Reargument Denied March 3, 2004. 
Background: Insureds brought class action against 
homeowners' insurers to recover for breach of contract and 
bad-faith failure to pay replacement cost for partial losses 
to dwellings before the property was repaired or replaced. 
The Court of Common Pleas, Bucks County, Civil 
Division, No. 01005040-16-1,Kane,J., sustained insurers' 
objections in nature of demurrer. Insureds appealed. 
Holdings: The Superior Court, No. 237 EDA 2003,Todd, 
J., held that: 
ill term "actual cash value" in some of the policies could 
not mean replacement value without a deduction for 
depreciation, and 
ill a policy with a dwelling replacement cost guarantee 
endorsement entitled insured to replacement cost without 
deduction for depreciation before repairing or replacing 
the property. 
Page 1 
AffIrmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Graci, J., filed a concurring and dissenting statement. 
West Headnotes 
ill Appeal and Error 30 ~863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature 
of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Review of an order sustaining preliminary objections 
is plenary. 
I1.l Appeal and Error 30 ~863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on Nature 
of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 ~917(1) 





30k917(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
--The Superior Court will sustain a demurrer only if, 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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assuming the material facts pled in the complaint to be 
true, plaintiff has failed to assert a legally cognizable I.2l Insurance 217 <C:=>1809 
cause of action. 
ill Pleading 302 <C:=>216(1) 
302 Pleading 
302V Demurrer or Exception 
302k216 Scope of Inquiry and Matters Considered 
on Demurrer in General 
302k216(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
When considering the grant of preliminary 0 bjections 
in the nature of a demurrer, the Superior Court must 
resolve the issues solely on the basis of the pleadings; no 
testimony or other evidence outside the complaint may be 
considered. 
HI Pleading 302 <C:=>218(1) 
302 Pleading 
302V Demurrer or Exception 
302k218 Hearing and Determination on Demurrer 
302k218( 1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Any doubt l1S to the legal sufficiency of the complaint 
should be resolved in favor of overruling demurrer. 
ill Insurance 217 <C:=>1822 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction 
217k1822 k. Plain, Ordinary or Popular Sense 
of Language. Most Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 <C:=>1855 
217 Insurance 
2 I 7XIII Contracts and Po licies 
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction 
217k 1855 k. Dictionaries. Most Cited Cases 
Words of common usage in an insurance policy are to 
be construed in their natural, plain, and ordinary sense, 
and courts may inform their understanding of these terms 
by considering their dictionary definitions. 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction 
217k 1809 k. Construction or Enforcement as 
Written. Most Cited Cases 
Where the language of the insurance policy is clear 
and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that 
language. 
III Insurance 217 <C:=>1832(1) 
2 I 7 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction 
217k 1830 Favoring Insureds or Beneficiaries; 
Disfavoring Insurers 
217k1832 Ambiguity, Uncertainty or 
Conflict 
2l7k 1832( 1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Where a provision of an insurance policy is 
ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in favor 
of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the 
agreement. 
00 Insurance 217 <C:=>1808 
217 Insurance 
217XIII Contracts and Policies 
217XIII(G) Rules of Construction 
217kl808 k. Ambiguity in General. Most Cited 
Cases 
While a court will not distort the meaning of 
insurance policy language or resort to a strained 
contrivance in order to find an ambiguity, it must find that 
contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject to 
more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to 
a particular set of facts. 
f2l Insurance 217 <C:=>2177 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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217 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2173 Amount of Damage or Loss 
217k2177 k. Partial Loss. Most Cited Cases 
Insurance 217 ~2181 
217 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2180 Valuation 
217k2181 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
In partial loss situations, in the absence of clear 
language to the contrary, a property insurer may not 
deduct depreciation from the replacement cost to arrive at 
actual cash value; rather, "actual cash value" is 
replacement cost without deduction for depreciation, 
where such deduction would thwart the insured's 
expectation to be made whole. 
I1.ill Insurance 217 ~2181 
217 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2180 Valuation 
217k2181 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
Where qualifying language is absent and an insured is 
promised "actual cash value," the insured is entitled to the 
cost to repair or replace the damaged property without a 
depreciation deduction. 
I.lll Courts 106 ~92 
106 Courts 
10611 Establishment, Organization, and Procedure 
106I1(G) Rules of Decision 
106k88 Previous Decisions as Controlling or as 
Precedents 
106k92 k. Dicta. Most Cited Cases 
Repetition does not elevate assertions that are 
otherwise dictum into binding precedent. 
I.!1l Insurance 217 ~2172 
217 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2167 Amount of Insurance 
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217k2172 k. Replacement. Most Cited 
Cases 
Insurance 217 ~2181 
217 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2180 Valuation 
217k2181 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
The term "actual cash value" in homeowners' 
insurance policies could not mean replacement value 
without a deduction for depreciation; the policies entitled 
the insureds to actual cash value if they did not repair or 
replace the damage, stated that payment of actual cash 
value "may" include a deduction for depreciation, and 
unambiguously allowed the insurers to deduct depreciation 
until repair or replacement was made. 
WUInsurance 217 ~2172 
217 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2167 Amount of Insurance 
217k2 I 72 k. Replacement. Most Cited 
Cases 
Insurance 217 ~2181 
217 Insurance 
217XVI Coverage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2180 Valuation 
217k2181 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
The term "actual cash value" in homeowners' 
insurance policies could not mean replacement value 
without a deduction for depreciation; although the policies 
did not define "actual cash value," they required payment 
© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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of actual cash value until or unless repair or replacement 
was made. 
[HJ. Insurance 217 ~2172 
217 Insurance 
217XVI Co verage--Property Insurance 
217XVI(A) In General 
217k2167 Amount of Insurance 
217k2172 k. Replacement. Most Cited 
Cases 
Homeowners' insurance policy entitled insured to 
replacement cost without deduction for depreciation 
before repairing or replacing partial loss to dwelling; 
although the policy limited payment to actual cash value 
until completion of repair or replacement, the dwelling 
replacement cost guarantee endorsement required payment 
of replacement cost without deduction for depreciation, 
the definition of "actual cash value" as including a 
depreciation deduction was in a section of the policy 
applicable to losses other than damage to dwelling, and 
the interrelation between the primary policy language and 
the endorsement language resulted in an ambiguity. 
*1040 Jonathan Wheeler, Philadelphia and Joseph A. 
Zenstein, Jenkintown, for appellants. 
Mark J. Levin, Philadelphia, for Allstate. 
Moira C. Duggan, Philadelphia, for Keystone Insurance. 
Before: TODD, GRACI, and T AMILIA, 11. 
TODD,J. 
Cj[ 1 In this class action,lli.!. Appellants, who are home 
owner's insurance policy holders and who have sued on 
their own behalf and as representatives of classes of 
similarly situated persons, ask us to review the order 
entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas 
sustaining the preliminary objections in the nature of a 
demurrer filed by the Appellee insurers. We affIrm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand. 
FNt. Although this litigation was commenced as 
a class action, it has not been certified. Under 
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Rule 1707 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure, class action certification is not 
determined until after the pleadings are closed. 
As this appeal is before us following the grant of 
preliminary objections, the pleadings have not 
closed, and so class certification has not yet been 
determined below. 
Cj[ 2 As this appeal comes to us following the 
sustaining of preliminary objections against Appellants, 
the following background is gleaned from Appellants' 
amended complaint.ft!l Appellants have "replacement 
cost" home owner's insurance policies, separately and 
variously, with Appellees State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company ("State Farm"), Allstate Insurance Company 
("Allstate"), Metropolitan Property and Casualty 
Insurance Company ("Metropolitan"), Ace American 
Insurance Company ("Ace American"), Ace Fire 
Underwriters Insurance Company ("Ace Fire"), Markel 
American Insurance Company ("Markel"), One Beacon 
Insurance d/b/a Pennsylvania General Insurance Company 
("One Beacon"), Keystone Insurance Company 
("Keystone"), and Erie Insurance Company ("Erie"). Each 
of Appellants have suffered partial physical losses to 
buildings covered under their respective policies. 
FN2. The original complaint filed on August 3, 
2001 identified 31 separate plaintiff-insureds and 
28 separate defendant-insurers. Following a court 
conference, the insurers supplied the insureds 
with copies of the applicable insurance policies. 
After reviewing the policies and concluding that 
19 of the policies contained unobjectionable 
language and that the case should be 
discontinued as to those issuing insurers, an 
amended complaint was filed alleging causes of 
action by the present Appellants (10 insureds) 
and the present Appellees (9 insurers). 
Cj[ 3 At the core of this present dispute is the meaning 
of the phrase "actual cash value," as used and, to varying 
degrees, defined in the replacement cost policies at issue. 
Appellants assert that they have not received full 
indemnification under their insurance policies with 
Appellees for their partial losses because Appellees have 
deducted depreciation from the actual cost to repair or 
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replace the damaged portion of their buildings. Appellants 
contend that, under Pennsylvania law, unless the phrase 
"actual cash value" is specifically defined in an insurance 
policy to include depreciation, depreciation is not to be 
included, and a policy holder is entitled to 
repair/replacement cost. They assert that the definition of 
"actual cash value" in the policies issued by Appellees 
lacks the necessary*1041 specificity, and that, as a result, 
Appellees breached their contracts with Appellants by 
failing to proffer repair/replacement costs. 
14 Appellees, on the other hand, assert that the issue 
is one of timing: they do not dispute Appellants' 
entitlement to replacement cost coverage, but, rather, 
assert that the policies specify that Appellants must first 
undertake to repair or replace the damaged property 
before being fully compensated. Until the damage is 
repaired or replaced, Appellees assert that, given the 
definition and usage of the phrase "actual cash value" in 
the respective policies, Appellants are entitled only to 
repair/replacement cost minus depreciation. 
I 5 Challenging Appellees' practice of deducting 
depreciation from Appellants' loss settlements, Appellants 
brought suit alleging breach of contract, insurance bad 
faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371, and violation of the 
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 
("UTPCPL"), 73 P.S. § 20 I-I et seq. As noted, Appellants 
brought this suit as a class action, on their own behalf and 
as representatives of classes of similarly situated persons 
in Pennsylvania. 
16 FollowingthefilingofAppellants'amended complaint. 
Appellees filed preliminary objections in the nature of a 
demurrer to each of Appellants' causes of action, asserting, 
inter alia, that given the language of the policies at issue, 
Appellants had failed to allege a breach of contract. 
17 On November 18, 2002, the trial court granted the 
preliminary objections, finding that under the policy 
language and Pennsylvania caselaw, Appellants had failed 
to allege claims for breach of contract. The court rejected 
Appellants' arguments that the phrase "actual cash value" 
could never include depreciation under Pennsylvania law, 
and that, as used and defined in their respective policies, 
the phrase did not include depreciation. Thus, the court 
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concluded that under the policies, Appellees were not 
required, in the first instance, to proffer repair or 
replacement costs without depreciation. For related 
reasons, the trial court found that Appellants had failed to 
allege claims for bad faith and a violation of the UTPCPL. 
Accordingly, the court dismissed Appellants' amended 
complaint. (Trial Court Order, 12118/02.) 
18 Appellants appealed this determination, and now 
ask: "Is an insurance company permitted to withhold 
depreciation from a policyholder's actual cash value 
payment from partial losses where the phrase 'actual cash 
value' is not defined in the insurance policy or where the 
insurance policy states that there may be a deduction for 
depreciation when determining actual cash value?" 
(Appellants' Brief at 3.) 
[1][2](3][4]1 9 Our review of an order sustaining 
preliminary objections is plenary. Sunbeam Corp. v. 
Libertv Mut. Ins. Co., 740 A.2d 1179, 1183 
(Pa.Super.1999). We will sustain the demurrer only if, 
assuming the material facts pled in the complaint to be 
true, "plaintiff has failed to assert a legally cognizable 
cause of action." Id. When considering the grant of 
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, this 
Court must "resolve the issues solely on the basis of the 
pleadings; no testimony or other evidence outside the 
complaint may be considered." Mellon Bank. N.A. v. 
Fabinvi. 437 Pa.Super. 559, 567-68, 650 A.2d 895, 899 
(994) (citation omitted). Any doubt as to the legal 
sufficiency ofthe complaint should be resolved in favor of 
overruling the demurrer. 220 Partnership v. Philadelphia 
Electric Co .. 437 Pa.Super. 650, 654, 650 A.2d 1094, 
1096 (1994). 
*1042110 Further, to support a claim for breach of 
contract, "a plaintiff must plead: 1) the existence of a 
contract, including its essential terms; 2) a breach of a 
duty imposed by the contract; and 3) resultant damage." 
Presbyterian Medical Center v. Budd, 832 A.2d 1066, 
1070 (Pa.Super.2003). There is no dispute in this case that 
elements one and three have been pled sufficiently. At 
issue, therefore, is whether Appellants have pled 
sufficiently a duty on the part of Appellees. 
III Whether a contract imposes a duty is a matter of 
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contract interpretation. In turn, interpretation of an 
insurance contract is a matter of law. Madison Const. Co. 
v. Harleysville MUI.Ins. Co .. 557 Pa, 595,606,735 A.2d 
100, 106 (1999). Our standard of review, therefore, is 
plenary. Young V. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the 
United States. 350 Pa.Super. 247,252,504 A.2d 339, 341 
(1986). In interpreting the language of an insurance 
policy, the goal is "to ascertain the intent of the parties as 
manifested by the language of the written instrument." See 
Madison, 557 Pa, at 606, 735 A.2d at 106. Indeed, our 
Supreme Court has instructed that the "polestar of our 
inquiry ... is the language of the insurance policy." Id. 
[5J[ 6][7] [8] <][ 12 Furthermore, when construing a policy, 
"[ w]ords of common usage ... are to be construed in their 
natural, plain and ordinary sense ... and we may inform 
our understanding of these terms by considering their 
dictionary definitions;" where "the language of the 
[policy] is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to 
give effect to that language." !d. at 606-608. 735 A.2d at 
106-108 (citations omitted). However, "[w]here a 
provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is 
to be construed in favor of the insured and against the 
insurer, the drafter of the agreement." Id. at 606, 735 A.2d 
at 106. Thus, while a court will not "distort the meaning of 
the language or resort to a strained contrivance in order to 
find an ambiguity", it must find that "contractual terms are 
ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable 
interpretation when applied to a particular set offacts." Id. 
<][ 13 We begin by reviewing the relevant language of 
the policies at issue. Each of the policies is a replacement 
cost policy, but each, Appellees assert, requires the 
insured first to endeavor to repair or replace damage 
before full replacement costs will be proffered. The 
policies refer to "actual cash value" as the compensation 
that will be provided until repairs are completed, and, to 
varying degrees, the policies define "actual cash value" as 
including a deduction for depreciation. In order to 
facilitate our analysis of these policies, we break them into 
three groups. In the first group, comprised of the State 
Farm, Keystone, Ace American, and One Beacon policies, 
the policies are silent as to the definition of "actual cash 
value." In relevant part, the State Farm policy provides: 
a. We will pay the cost to repair or replace ... subject to 
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the following: 
(1) until actual repair or replacement is completed, we 
will pay only the actual cash value at the time of the 
loss of the damaged part of the property ... ; 
(2) when the repair or the replacement is actually 
completed, we will pay the covered additional amount 
you actually and necessarily spend to repair or 
replace the damaged part of the property ... ; 
(State Farm Policy, at 11 (RR 35a).) The Keystone 
and Ace American policies provide as follows: 
(4) [W]e will pay no more than the actual cash value of 
the damage unless: 
*1043 (a) actual repair or replacement is complete; or 
(b) the cost to repair or replace the damage is both: 
(i) less than 5% of the amount of insurance in this 
policy on the building; and 
(ii) less than [$2500 in ACE American; $1000 in 
Keystone]. 
(Keystone Policy, Endorsement HO-3, at 10-11 (RR 
73a-74a); Ace American Policy, at 7 (RR 54a).) Finally, 
the One Beacon policy provides: 
(4) We will pay no more than the actual cash value of 
the damage until actual repair or replacement is 
complete. Once actual repair or replacement is 
complete, we will settle the loss according to the 
provisions of b.(l) and b. (2) above [which pay the 
replacement cost "without deduction for depreciation" 
of the part of the building damaged]. 
However, if the cost to repair or replace the damage 
is both: 
(a) less than 5% of the amount of the insurance in this 
policy on the building; and 
(b) less than $2500, 
we will settle the loss according to the provisions of 
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b.(l) and (b).2 above whether or not actual repair or 
replacement is complete. 
(One Beacon Policy, at 8 (RR 66a).) 
«J[ 14 In the second group, comprised of the Allstate, 
Metropolitan, Ace Fire, and Markel policies, the policies 
explicitly refer to depreciation as a deduction from "actual 
cash value." The Allstate policy provides as follows: 
b) Actual Cash Value. If you do not repair or replace the 
damaged, destroyed or stolen property, payment will be 
on an actual cash value basis. This means there may be 
a deduction for depreciation .... 
You may make claim for additional payment as 
described in paragraph c, and paragraph d if 
applicable, if you repair or replace the damaged, 
destroyed or stolen covered property within 180 days 
of the actual cash value payment. 
(Allstate Policy, at 17 (RR 39a).) The Metropolitan 
policy provides: 
b. [W]e will not pay more than the actual cash value 
of the damage to the structure until actual repair or 
replacement is complete. You may make a further 
claim within 180 days after the loss, provided you 
stilI have an insurable interest in the property, for any 
additional liability based on the replacement cost 
value at the time of the loss. 
Actual cash value means there may be a deduction for 
depreciation. 
(Metropolitan Policy, Endorsement H303, at 2 (RR 
50a).) The Ace Fire policy provides: 
You can make a claim for loss or damage to a building 
based solely on the replacement cost of the damage less 
depreciation. If you then repair or rep lace the damaged 
property and the amount you received does not cover 
your loss, you may make a claim for the rest of your loss 
based on the replacement cost basis. The claim must be 
made, however, within 180 days from the date of the 
loss. 
(Ace Fire Policy, at 2 (RR 57a).) Finally, the Markel 
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policy provides as follows: 
d) if "you" repair or replace the damaged property for 
the same use and on the same or contiguous site, "we" 
will pay the amount actually and necessarily spent to 
repair or replace such property to a condition and 
appearance*1044 similar to that which existed at the 
time of the loss. 
* * * 
e) If "you" decide not to repair or replace under 
paragraph d) above, the settlement will be made 
according to Actual Cash Value. This means there may 
be a deduction for depreciation. 
(Markel Policy, Endorsement ML-255 (RR 63a).) 
«J[ 15 We place the remaining policy, the Erie policy, 
in its own category, as the interrelation of the primary 
policy language and the endorsement is more complicated, 
and affects the interpretation and meaning of "actual cash 
value". The Erie policy states, in the main body: 
(8) LOSS SETTLEMENT 
The following types of losses will be settled on an 
actual cash value basis. This means that we will deduct 
for depreciation. 
Losses to: 
• property insured under Personal Property Coverage 
• structures that are not buildings or carports 
• carpeting 
• household appliances 
• cloth awnings 
• outdoor antennas and outdoor equipment, whether 
or not attached to buildings 
• insured buildings and structures which do not meet 
the requirements for a replacement cost settlement 
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described below. 
The actual cash value will be determined at the time of 
the loss. Payment will not exceed the amount necessary 
to repair or replace the damaged property. 
Dwelling and Other Structures Coverage 
Loss under Dwelling Coverage or Other Structures 
Coverage will be settled by one of the following 
methods: 
1. REPLACEMENT COST SETTLEMENT 
(meaning we will not deduct for depreciation): 
*** 
2. LESS THAN FULL REPLACEMENT COST 
SETTLEMENT 
Iffull replacement cost settlement does not apply, we 
will pay the larger of the following amounts, but not 
exceeding the amount of insurance under this policy 
applying to the building: 
a. the actual cash value of that part of the building 
damaged; or 
*** 
We will pay no more than actual cash value of the 
damage until the actual repair or replacement is 
completed .... 
You may disregard the replacement cost provision and 
make claim for loss or damage to buildings on an actual 
cash value basis. 
You have the right to make claim, within 180 days after 
the loss, for any additional amounts we will be required 
to pay under this Loss Settlement provision. 
(Erie Policy, at 11 (RR I58a).) The Erie 
endorsement adds the following language, in relevant part: 
8. Loss Settlement 
2. Under Dwelling Coverage loss will be settled on a 
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replacement cost basis, without deduction for 
depreciation. Payment will not exceed the smallest of 
the following amounts: 
- the replacement cost of that part of the dwelling 
damaged for equivalent construction and use on the 
same premises; 
*1045 - the amount actually and necessarily spent to 
repair or replace the damaged dwelling. 
ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE POllCY 
APPLY. 
(Erie Policy Dwelling Replacement Cost Guarantee 
Endorsement HP-BK (RR 159a).).!:m 
FN3. This endorsement was omitted from 
Appellants' amended complaint but attached to 
Erie's preliminary objections. 
<J[ 16 We now turn to a review of the meaning of the 
phrase "actual cash value" because, as we have noted, the 
usage and meaning of this phrase is at the heart of the 
present dispute. Analysis of the phrase has a long history 
in the courts of this Commonwealth. In Fedas v. Insurance 
Co. ofthe State of Pennsylvania, 300 Pat 555, 151 A. 285 
(1930), our Supreme Court first comprehensively 
addressed the meaning of this phrase in an insurance 
policy. In Fedas, the Court considered whether an insurer 
could deduct depreciation in the event of a partial loss 
under a fire insurance policy. The policy allowed 
compensation for "[a]ctual cash value (ascertained with 
proper deductions for depreciation) on the property at the 
time of loss or damage, but not exceeding the amount 
which it would cost to repair or replace the same with 
materials of like kind and quality within a reasonable time 
after such loss or damage." /d. at 561, 151 A. at 287. The 
Court stated that "in ascertaining the loss resulting from 
the partial burning of a building, the true result is to be 
reached by taking the cost of reconstruction according to 
the conditions existing and lawfully imposed at the time 
when the fire occurred." Id. The Court explained that 
"actual cash value" was not the same as market value, 
which would incorporate depreciation, but rather was akin 
to replacement cost: 
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Generally speaking, 'actual cash value' does not mean 
market value, as the term is understood. 'Market value,' 
as here urged, embidies [sic] what a purchaser willing to 
buy feels justified in paying for property which one is 
willing but not required to sell. 'Market value' includes 
factors of time, place, circumstance, use, and benefit; 
depreciation is included, but one figure is the result of 
these considerations, the price to be paid. Ordinarily 
actual cash value has no relation to any of these factors; 
it is value under all times, such as the cost of 
manufacturing or building or book value. The policy 
intended something different from market value; the 
latter includes 'depreciation,' while the 'actual cash 
value' of the policy is to be diminished by 
'depreciation.' Actual cash value in a policy of 
insurance means what it would cost to replace a 
building or a chattel as of the date of the fire. 
Where a building is entirely destroyed, the application 
of the rule is simple; where a building is partically [sic] 
destroyed, it may be difficult to arrive at actual cash 
value, less depreciation if it is to be considered; but 
difficulties cannot prevent the right to compensation. 
There enters into actual cash value of the part 
destroyed the fact that it was a part of an entire 
property and the use made of it. It is summed up in the 
idea 'the cost of replacing in as nearly as possible the 
condition as it existed at the date of the fire. ' 
[d. at 562-63, 151 A. at 288 (emphasis added). The 
Court concluded that, regardless of the reference to 
depreciation deductions, the insured was entitled to 
replacement cost, as this was the only recompense*1046 
that could make the insured whole under the 
circumstances: 
The actual cost of new material, with deduction for 
depreciation, which is not sufficient to replace the 
building as nearly as it could be as of the date of the 
fire, does not comply with the policy, which was to 
insure against loss not exceeding the amount named in 
the insurance. 
." The result reached is that called for in the 
policy-replacement as nearly as possible, or its cost. If 
part of the building destroyed cannot be replaced with 
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material of like kind and quality, then it should be 
substantially duplicated within the meaning of the 
policy. 
.. , To sum up, 'actual cash value' means the actual 
value expressed in terms of money of the thing for the 
purpose for which it was used; in other words, the real 
value to replace. The rule established by our decisions 
seeks a result which will enable the parties to restore the 
property to as near the same condition as it was at the 
time of the fire, or pay for it is [sic] cash; that was the 
loss insured against.. .. 
[d. at 563-64, 151 A. at 288. Thus, under Fedas, 
where an insured suffers a partial loss and is promised 
"actual cash value," he is entitled to replacement cost, 
without deduction for depreciation. 
1{ 17 In Farberv. PerkiomenMut.lns. Co., 370Pa.480, 
88 A.2d 776 (1952), the Supreme Court again addressed 
the propriety of depreciation deductions with regard to a 
partial loss under a fire insurance policy. With language 
similar to that in Fedas, the policy at issue in Farber 
insured against loss "to the extent of the actual cash value 
of the property at the time of the loss, but not exceeding 
the amount which it would cost to repair or replace the 
property with material of like kind and quality within a 
reasonable time after such loss." [d. at 486, 88 A.2d at 
779. The insured suffered a partial loss and, while the cost 
of labor and materials necessary to restore the building 
was more than the policy limit, the depreciated value was 
less than the limit, and the insurer offered only the 
depreciated value. The Court concluded that, under F edas 
and other decisions of the Court, the insured was entitled 
to full replacement cost (up to the policy limit), without 
deduction for depreciation. [d. at 486, 88 A.2d at 779. 
Indeed, the Court added that, in the absence of a change 
by the insurers to their policies, no other result was 
allowable: 
The legal meaning of ["actual cash value"] having been 
determined and established by prior decisions of this 
court, we cannot now depart therefrom without 
impairing the obligation of the contracts as written. Nor 
is there any legally meritorious basis for suggesting the 
necessity for a change in the interpretation of the 
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contracts. The defendant companies prepare their own 
policy forms and presumably exclude therefrom 
anything for which they desire not to assume liability. 
Moreover, insurance companies are, of course, 
conversant with the germane court decisions .... Any 
change in the defendants' policies in order to avoid in 
the future the impact of our prior decisions is for them 
to ponder. What they presently seek cannot justly be 
accorded by court decision. 
Id. at 486-87, 88 A.2d at 779. Thus, where a policy 
promises "actual cash value," the insured is entitled to 
replacement cost. See also Judge v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 
303 Pa.Super. 221, 227-228, 449 A.2d 658, 661 (1982) 
(quoting with approval the language from Fedas that 
"[a]ctual cash value in a policy of insurance means what 
it would cost to replace a building or a chattel as of the 
date of the fIre.") 
*10471[ 18 The signifIcance of the fInal admonition 
in Farber was apparent in this Court's decision in London 
v. Illsurance Placement Facility of Pennsylvania, 703 
A.2d 45 (Pa.Super.1997) (en bane ). There, the Court 
addressed whether the Insurance Placement Facility of 
Pennsylvania, which offered fIre insurance policies under 
the Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act,E!:l± should be permitted to 
depreciate the cost of repairing a building partially 
destroyed by fIre. The policy in question compensated for 
losses "to the extent of the actual cash value of the 
property at the time of loss, but not exceeding the amount 
which it would cost to repair or replace the property." Id. 
at 47 (emphasis omitted). The phrase "actual cash value" 
was defIned in the policy as "the cost to repair or replace 
the damaged property less deductions for physical 
deterioration (depreciation) and obsolescence." Id. 
(emphasis omitted). The insureds asserted that 
Pennsylvania caselaw prohibited the insurers from 
deducting depreciation in a partial loss situation under a 
standard fIre policy. While admitting that the insureds 
"may be correct," id. at 48, the Court rejected their 
contention that a Fair Plan Act policy was the equivalent 
of a standard fIre policy. Id. at 48-49. Moreover, the Court 
held that the insurers had responded to the invitation of the 
Supreme Court in Farber, supra, to tailor their policies 
and clarify their coverage: 
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FN4. 40 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1600.101-.502. As a 
response to urban riots in the 1960s, the Fair 
Plan Act "requires each insurer that writes 
property insurance in this Commonwealth to 
participate in providing insurance for high-risk 
property for which insurance is not normally 
available." London, 703 A.2d at 48. 
The Farber decision arguably prevents insurance 
companies from deducting depreciation in the event of 
a partial loss that does not exceed the depreciated value 
of the whole property. If the companies wanted to avoid 
such a result, the court plainly suggested that they 
should modify their policies. 
As the endorsement defIning "actual cash value" 
demonstrates, the Facility has done exactly what the 
Farber court advised. Presumably dissatisfIed with the 
interpretation of "actual cash value" by the court, the 
Facility sought to defIne the phrase with greater 
precision. Especially when the high-risk associated with 
insuring property under the Fair Plan is considered, it is 
logical that the Facility would choose to protect itself 
with specifIc defInitions of terms or phrases. Finally, it 
is an extremely unremarkable choice when one 
considers that our Supreme Court invited insurance 
companies to do this in Farber. 
Id. at 50 (footnote omitted). London stands for the 
proposition that, although Fedas and Farber, supra, 
remain viable, explicit policy language may avoid their 
effects. 
12lIJ.Ql1[ 19 From these cases, we conclude that in 
partial loss situations, in the absence of clear language to 
the contrary, an insurer may not deduct depreciation from 
the replacement cost of a policy and that the phrase "actual 
cash value" may not be interpreted as including a 
depreciation deduction, where such deduction would 
thwart the insured's expectation to be made whole. Where 
qualifying language is absent and an insured is promised 
"actual cash value," the insured is entitled to the cost to 
repair or replace the damaged property. Under F edas and 
Farber, supra, our Supreme Court asserts that such 
compensation is the only thing that can make an insured 
whole. London, supra, holds that a different result can be 
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contracted for, but the policy must be clear in that regard. 
*1048 i 20 Appellees cite to Callulli v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 315 Pa.Super. 460, 462 A.2d 286 (1983) and 
Gilderman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 437 Pa.Super. 217, 649 
A.2d 941 (1994), for the proposition that "actual cash 
value" can only mean the cost of repair or replacement 
minus depreciation. We find Appellees' reliance on these 
cases to be misplaced. It is true that in Canulli this Court, 
inexplicably citing Farber, supra, states that "actual cash 
value" includes depreciation. See Canulli. 315 Pa.Super. 
at 462, 462 A.2d at 287 (" 'Actual cash value' is the actual 
cost of repair or replacement less depreciation."). Putting 
aside that this assertion is in direct contravention to the 
holding in Farber, we note that the Canulli Court 
ultimately quashed the appeal by the insureds in that case 
as interlocutory, thus rendering the Court's definition of 
actual cash value nonbinding dictum. See London. 703 
A.2d at 58 n. 7 (Ford Elliott, J., concurring and 
dissenting); see generally TH. v. L.R.M.. 753 A.2d 873, 
883 n. 2 (Pa.Super.2000) (dictum is not binding on this 
Court or trial courts), affd 567 Pa. 222, 786 A.2d 913 
(2001). 
illl i 21 In Gilderman, this Court likewise stated that 
"actual cash value" is "the actual cost of repair or 
replacement less depreciation." Gildermall, 437 Pa.Super. 
at 221, 649 A.2d at 943. The Court cited only Canulli for 
this proposition, and we note that repetition does not 
elevate assertions that are otherwise dictum into binding 
precedent. See Commonwealth v. Perry. 568 Pa. 499, 529, 
798 A.2d 697, 715 (2002) (Castille, J., concurring) 
("Dicta is not converted into binding constitutional 
precedent through repetition.") Moreover, the Court in 
Gilderman was not strictly concerned with the issue of 
depreciation; rather, there, the insurer asserted that "actual 
cash value" included both depreciation and a flat 20% fee 
(allegedly corresponding to contractor overhead). 
Gilder/nan. 437 Pa.Super. at 221. 649 A.2d at 943. As the 
insurers were not alleging that they were "entitled to full 
repair or replacement costs without a depreciation 
deduction prior to actual repair or replacement," the 
definition of "actual cash value" was not directly relevant. 
Id. at 222, 649 A.2d at 943. Thus, we are not persuaded by 
Appellees' citation to these cases. 
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i 22 Turning now to the policies at issue in the instant 
case, we note that absent from Fedas, Farber, and 
London, however, is the situation present herein which 
involves not the denial of liability for replacement cost, 
but the timing of that compensation. The trial court noted 
that Appellees "have never denied liability or failed to 
guarantee reimbursement for the repair or replacement of 
the lost personal property." !.:!:ii (Trial Court Opinion, 
3118/02, at 11.) Rather, Appellees maintain that they are 
only liable for such costs once replacement or repair is 
completed.EJ2 Unlike*1049 Fedas, Farber, and London, 
wherein the insurers contested liability for such 
replacement costs without including depreciation, here, 
only the timing of such payments is at issue.B:!1 Thus, the 
policy considerations underlying these cases-that an 
insured should be made whole, and that in the absence of 
language to the contrary, to make an insured whole "actual 
cash value" must be interpreted to mean replacement val ue 
without depreciation-apply with less force herein as there 
is no question that Appellants will be made whole by 
Appellees ultimately, if not initially. 
FN5. Nor have Appellants sought such coverage. 
As the trial court explained: 
There are no facts offered that the [Appellants] 
actually completed the repairs or replacements 
to their respective properties, that they ever 
contracted to make the repairs or 
replacements, or that they ever even intended 
or attempted to repair or replace said property. 
Furthermore, this is no allegation that 
[Appellants] ever advised the [Appellees] that 
they wanted to make appropriate repairs, or 
that they submitted documentation to the 
[Appellees] showing that any repairs were 
made. 
(Trial Court Opinion, 3/18/02, at 7-8.) 
FN6. The trial court noted in its Opinion that 
Appellees: 
have represented to this Court, in their 
pleadings as well as at oral argument, that even 
if [Appellants] did intend to repair or replace 
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their claimed losses, they would not be 
required to expend their own funds up front to 
effectuate the repairs. To the contrary, once 
the [Appellants] undertake to make the 
appropriate repairs or replacements, for 
example, by contracting to do so, these 
insurers would pay the full cost of repairing or 
replacing the property. 
(Trial Court Opinion, 3/18/02, at 8 n. 
4)( emphasis original.) 
FN7. Appellants have not asserted that this 
two-step process, in itself, is contrary to 
Pennsylvania caselaw or public policy. We, 
therefore, offer no opinion in that regard. 
<J[ 23 In light of the foregoing, and after a review of the 
nine policies at issue, we conclude that, with the exception 
of Erie which we discuss further below, Appellants have 
failed to allege breach of contract claims against 
Appellees. We begin by discussing the policies in the 
second group. 
LW <J[ 24 These poJicies-issued by Allstate, Metropolitan, 
Ace Fire, and Markel-clearly note that compensation will 
be paid out on an actual cash value basis which "may" 
include a deduction for depreciation (see Allstate Policy, 
at 17 (RR 39a); Metropolitan Policy, EndorsementH303, 
at 2 (RR 50a); Markel Policy, Endorsement ML-255 
(RR 63a», or that compensation will be "less 
depreciation" (see Ace Fire Policy, at 2 (RR 57a». Like 
the insurer in London, supra, Allstate, Metropolitan, Ace 
Fire, and Markel appear to have followed the Supreme 
Court's advice in Farbe.r.and have tailored their policies to 
clarify the extent of their intended coverage. We find no 
merit to Appellants' assertion that the use of "may" makes 
the policies ambiguous or misleading. 
<J[ 25 Moreover, and more persuasively, when read in 
the context of the language of the policies at issue, we 
conclude, as did the trial court, that the phrase "actual cash 
value" as used in those policies cannot mean replacement 
value, as Appellants contend, as such an interpretation 
would make the remaining policy language nonsensical. In 
each of these policies, there is qualifying language 
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indicating that "actual cash value" will be the proffered 
compensation where the insured does not repair or replace 
the damage. (See Allstate Policy, at 17 (RR 39a) ("If you 
do not repair or replace the damaged, destroyed or stolen 
property, payment will be on an actual cash value basis." 
(emphasis added»; Metropolitan Policy, Endorsement 
H303, at 2 (RR 50a) ("[W]e will not pay more than the 
actual cash value of the damage to the structure until 
actual repair or replacement is complete." (emphasis 
added»; Ace Fire Policy, at 2 (RR 58a) ("If you then 
repair or replace the damaged property and the 
[depreciated cost] does not cover your loss, you may make 
a claim for the rest of your loss based on the replacement 
cost basis." (emphasis added»; Markel Policy, 
Endorsement ML-255 (RR 63a) ("If 'you' decide not to 
repairor replace under paragraph d) above, the settlement 
will be made according to Actual Cash Value." (emphasis 
added».) Thus, "actual cash value" cannot also mean 
"replacement value." Given that the policies have defined 
"actual cash value" to include deductions for depreciation, 
we find that the policies unambiguously allow the insurers 
*1050 to deduct depreciation until repair or replacement 
is made. 
<J[ 26 Moreover, with respect to these policies, there is 
no concern, as was present in Fedas and Farber, supra, 
that the insureds will not be made whole. Here, Appellees 
have conceded liability for replacement cost once 
Appellants undertake to repair or replace the damage to 
their properties. Again, the issue is one of the timing of 
compensation, not its extent. 
LLli <J[ 27 We come to the same conclusion regarding 
the policies in the first group. These policies-issued by 
State Farm, Keystone, Ace American, and One Beacon-do 
not contain any definition for "actual cash value." When 
read in the context of the language of the policies, 
however, we note, as we did for the policies in the second 
group, that the phrase "actual cash value" as used in those 
policies cannot be synonymous with replacement value, as 
Appellants contend, as such an interpretation would make 
the remaining policy language nonsensical. The language 
of these policies is clear that only "actual cash value" will 
be proffered "until" or "unless" repair or replacement is 
made. (See State Farm Policy, at 11 (RR 35a) ("until 
actual repair or replacement is completed, we will pay 
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only the actual cash value at the time of the loss" 
(emphasis added)); Keystone Policy, Endorsement HO-3, 
at 10-11 (RR 73a-74a) ("we will pay no more than actual 
cash value of the damage unless .,. actual repair or 
replacement is complete " (emphasis added)); Ace 
American Policy, at 7 (RR 54a) (same); One Beacon 
Policy, at 8 (RR 66a) ("We will pay no more than the 
actual cash value of the damage until actual repair or 
replacement is complete." (emphasis added)).) 
Cj[ 28 Appellants do not assert that the phrase "actual 
cash value" as used in these policies is ambiguous; rather, 
they assert that it may not include a deduction for 
depreciation. We disagree. The only interpretation of the 
phrase "actual cash value" in these policies that makes 
sense is one that includes depreciation deductions. 
Moreover, this interpretation does not run afoul of Fedas 
and Farber, supra, as, under these policies, the insureds 
ultimately will be made whole. That is, as in the policies 
in the second group, there is no concern here, as was 
present in Fedas and Farber, that the inclusion of 
depreciation deductions will not fully compensate the 
insured. 
Il.:!:.l Cj[ 29 We finally address the policy issued by Erie, 
which we have quoted at length above. While the policy 
clearly defines, in one section, "actual cash value" to mean 
that Erie "will deduct for depreciation," (Erie Policy, at 11 
(RR 158a)), and while the policy states that Erie "will 
pay no more than actual cash value ofthe damage until the 
actual repair or replacement is completed" (id.), we find 
that the interrelation between the primary policy language 
and the endorsement language results in an ambiguity. 
First, as Appellants point out, the definition of "actual 
cash value" is prefaced with language indicating that it 
applies only to "the following types of losses" which 
specifically exclude dwelling damage as alleged herein. 
(Id.) Second, while later language in the "LOSS 
SETTLEMENT" section indicates that Erie "will pay no 
more than actual cash value of the damage until the actual 
repair or replacement is completed" (id.), it is unclear 
whether this phrase applies to dwelling damage once the 
endorsement language is overlaid. Specifically, the 
endorsement, which is entitled "DWELLING 
REPLACEMENT COST GUARANTEE 
ENDORSEMENT," specifically indicates that dwelling 
Page 13 
coverage "will be settled on a replacement cost basis, 
without deduction for depreciation." (Erie Policy Dwelling 
*1051 Replacement Cost Guarantee Endorsement HP-BK 
(RR 159a).) 
Cj[ 30 While it is reasonable to infer, as Appellees 
argue, that regardless of the endorsement, the provision in 
the main policy which indicates that only actual cash value 
will be offered until repair or replacement is complete 
remains, we conclude it is equally reasonable for a policy 
holder to interpret the policy, as Appellants suggest, to 
mean that replacement cost is to be paid in the first 
instance without depreciation deductions. As there are two 
reasonable interpretations of the policy language, we must 
apply the interpretation favoring the insureds. See 
Madison, 557 Pa. at 606, 735 A.2d at 106. At any rate, 
this ambiguity convinces us that it was error for the trial 
court to dismiss the breach of contract claim against Erie 
at this early preliminary objection stage of the litigation. 
See 220 Partnership v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 437 
Pa.Super. at 654,650 A.2d at 1096 (doubts as to the legal 
sufficiency of the complaint should be resolved in favor of 
overruling the demurrer). 
Cj[ 31 For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
the trial court properly dismissed the breach of contract 
claims against each of the Appellees, except for Erie, and 
accordingly affirm the order as to those Appellees. For the 
same reasons, we conclude the trial court· properly 
dismissed Appellants' related claims under the UTPCPL, 
again, except as against Erie, and accordingly afftrm the 
order as to those Appellees. We conclude, however, that 
the trial court erred in dismissing the breach of contract 
claim against Erie, and reverse the order below in that 
regard. Given that the trial court dismissed the UTPCPL 
claim against Erie based on an erroneous conclusion that 
the underlying breach of contract claims were meritless, 
we remand for the trial court to reconsider the UTPCPL 
claim against Erie in light of this opinion. Appellants have 
not challenged the dismissal of their bad faith claims 
against Appellees, and thus we do not disturb the trial 
court's determination in that respect. 
Cj[ 32 Order AFFIRMED as to Appellees State Farm 
Fire and Casualty Company, Allstate Insurance Company, 
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 
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Ace American Insurance Company, Ace Fire Underwriters 
Insurance Company, Markel American Insurance 
Company, One Beacon Insurance, and Keystone Insurance 
Company. Order REVERSED as to Appellee Erie 
Insurance Company. Case REMANDED for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction 
RELINQUISHED. 
<][ 33 GRACI, J. files a Concurring and Dissenting 
Statement. 
GRACI, J., Concurring and Dissenting. 
<][ 1 In typical fashion, the Opinion of the majority 
provides a thorough and compelling analysis of the 
complicated factual and legal issues presented in this case. 
I join its analysis and expression of the law in its entirety 
and differ from my esteemed colleagues only in the 
application of the law to the case against Erie. 
<][ 2 The learned majority appropriately cites Madison 
Const. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co .. 557 Pa. 595, 735 
A.2d 100, 106 (1999), for the proposition that a court 
"must find that 'contractual terms are ambiguous if they 
are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation 
when applied to a particular set of facts.' " Opinion, at 
lO42 (emphasis added). In my view, under the particular 
set of facts present in this case, the contractual terms 
which the majority finds ambiguous are not subject to 
more than one reasonable interpretation. Like the language 
in the *1052 other policies which the majority concludes 
yields a different result, the language of the Erie policy, 
under the particular facts present here, requires actual 
replacement before replacement value is due. The 
language in the Erie policy is the functional equivalent of 
that found sufficient in the other policies. Accordingly, in 
my view, the result should be the same. I WOUld, therefore, 
affirm the order of the trial court in its entirety. 
Pa.Super.,2003. 
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